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Abstract
Essays on the Economics of Health and Risky Behavior
by
Markus Gehrsitz

Adviser: Distinguished Professor Michael Grossman
As Forrest Gump has ever eloquently pointed out: stupid is as stupid does. It turns out
that most people engage in behavior that could reasonably be considered stupid, or at least
risky. People overeat, chain-smoke cigarettes, drink excessively, consume harmful drugs, and
drive too fast; if worst comes to worst they do some of these things simultaneously. This
work evaluates three policy measures that are designed to promote health and less risky
behavior: I evaluate the effects of penalties for speeding transgressions on future driving
behavior, the effects of low emission zones on infant health and air pollution, and the effects
of post-and-hold laws on alcohol consumption. Hence, this dissertation consists of three
chapters:
Chapter 1: “Speeding, Punishment, and Recidivism - Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design” The first paper estimates the effects of temporary driver’s
license suspensions on driving behavior. A little known rule in the German traffic penalty
catalogue maintains that drivers who commit a series of speeding transgressions within 365
days should have their license suspended for one month. My fuzzy regression discontinuity
design exploits the quasi-random assignment of license suspensions caused by the 365-day
cutoff and shows that 1-month license suspensions lower the probability of recidivating within
a year by 20 percent. This effect is not driven by incapacitation and indicates that temporary
license suspensions are an effective tool in preventing traffic transgressions.

v
Chapter 2: “More Than Hot Air? Low Emission Zones, Air Pollution, and
Infant Health” The second paper investigates the effect of low emission zones on birth
outcomes and air quality in Germany. The staggered introduction of the policy measure
creates a credible natural experiment and a natural control group for births and air pollution
measurements in cities that enact low emission zones. I show that the introduction of the
most restrictive type of low emission zone decreases average levels of fine particulate matter
by about 5 percent. However, these reductions are too small to translate into significant
improvements in infant health. My results are not driven by changes in maternal or city
specific characteristics, and are robust to variations in specification and to the choice of
control group.
Chapter 3: “The Effect of Post-and-Hold Laws on Alcohol Consumption” (coauthored with Henry Saffer) The third paper estimates the effects of post-and-hold
laws on alcohol consumption. Post-and-hold laws require alcohol wholesalers to provide a
list of prices to the state, which can be reviewed by retailers, competitors and the public.
These laws were generally enacted at the end of prohibition with the intention of limiting
alcohol consumption by raising prices. The laws may also have the unintended consequence
of protecting small retailers. Recently, several large retailers have argued in court that these
laws are counter to the Sherman Act, which limits anti-competitive behavior. This paper
follows the recent paper by Cooper and Wright (2012) and adds new data and new empirical
specifications. The estimation results provide no persuasive evidence of an effect of postand-hold laws on the consumption of either total ethanol, wine, or spirits. There is evidence
of a small effect of beer post-and-hold laws on beer consumption. One possible explanation
of this generally null effect is that the wholesale markets for alcohol are so highly regulated
that post-and-hold laws have no marginal effect. The empirical results presented in this
paper do support alcohol excise taxes as effective means of reducing alcohol consumption.
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Chapter 1
Speeding, Punishment, and
Recidivism - Evidence from a
Regression Discontinuity Design
He who undertakes to punish with reason does not avenge himself for the past offense,
since he cannot make what was done as though it had not come to pass; he looks rather to
the future, and aims at preventing that particular person and others who see him punished
from doing wrong again. (Plato, Protagoras p. 324)

1.1

Introduction

Worldwide, more than 1.2 million people die every year in traffic accidents (WHO, 2013).
In 2010, traffic injuries in the US claimed the lives of 45,342 Americans and caused medical
and work loss costs of more than $100 billion. Motor vehicle crashes are the leading cause
of death for those aged 15 to 35 (CDC, 2015). Numerous laws and regulations, such as
mandatory seatbelt use, speed limits, and blood alcohol concentration (BAC) limits, have
been enacted in order to promote road safety. Most developed countries have an elaborate
penalty catalogue in place that aims to punish and deter traffic offenders. Temporary license
1
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suspensions are a crucial component of these penalty catalogues. This measure not only
incapacitates traffic offenders by taking them off the streets for a short period of time. It is
also supposed to provide a “shot across the bows” by prompting offenders, who temporarily
experience the inconveniences of life without a driver’s license, to change their ways in the
long-run and drive more responsibly once they get their license back.
Yet, little is known about the effectiveness of temporary license suspensions. Economic
theory provides little guidance on this issue. On the one hand, Gary Becker’s (1974) model of
the “rational criminal” predicts that temporary license suspensions should have no long-run
effects. In this classical model, criminals weigh the expected costs of committing a crime
against the expected benefits. As long as a temporary license suspension has no effect on the
degree of a penalty for future transgression (e.g. through a three strike law), the measure
should not change this cost-benefit-trade-off. Traffic offenders are therefore just as likely to
commit another transgression before a temporary license suspension as they are after they
get their license back. On the other hand, the behavioral approach to the economics of crime
(Jolls et al., 1998, among others) offers many channels through which a temporary license
suspension might indeed have an effect. For instance, offenders might update their beliefs
about the actual cost of punishments or the probability that an offense is detected.
This is therefore ultimately an empirical issue. As Levitt and Miles (2007) point out, the
main challenge for empiricists is to distinguish causation from correlation. A naive comparison of the recidivism behavior of offenders who were punished for their criminal acts with
those who were not, cannot shed much light on the question of how effective penalties are
in deterring future crimes. After all, these penalties are not randomly assigned. People who
get punished because they committed a crime might be intrinsically prone to committing
crimes. Comparing their rates of recidivism to those of law abiding citizens is thus an apples
to oranges comparison. Traffic transgressions are no exception to this problem. As shown
below, a “naive” OLS regression yields a positive effect of license suspension on recidivism
even when conditioning on age, sex, and state fixed effects.
This illustrates the challenges in answering a seemingly simple question. The goal of this
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paper is to overcome these challenges. For that purpose, I exploit a little known but widely
applied rule in the German penalty catalogue for traffic violations which leads to a quasirandom suspension of some individuals’ driver’s licenses. Specifically, this rule maintains
that a person who commits two major speeding violations within 365 days, should have her
license revoked for one month. This gives rise to a fuzzy regression discontinuity design
where those to the left of the 365-day cutoff are likely to have their license revoked while
those to the right of the cutoff retain theirs. The rule appears to be obscure and complex
enough to prevent sorting to the right of the threshold. At the same time, the rule is very
much enforced by the traffic authorities. I find that a loss of license for one month reduces
the probability of recidivating within a year by about 20 percent. This result is robust to
the choice of different time windows and estimation techniques.

1.2

Background and Institutional Framework

Endogeneity issues in the relationship between punishment and criminal activity have been
recognized since at least the late 1990s (Levitt, 1996). Ever since, economists have come
up with various strategies to exploit some source of exogenous variation in order to isolate
causal effects of punishment on recidivism. Kessler and Levitt (1999) exploit sentence enhancements that are exogenously induced by California’s Proposition 8 to evaluate the effect
of harsher sentences on crime. They find that harsher punishments reduce crime substantially. Helland and Tabarrok (2007) utilize idiosyncrasies in the same state’s three strike
policy to isolate a large and significant deterrence effect of the policy. Lee and McCrary
(2009) use the fact that juvenile criminals tend to be sentenced as adults once they turn
eighteen, and find only small deterrence effects of more severe penalties.
Drago et al. (2009) analyze sentence reductions for certain parts of the Italian prison population due to a collective clemency bill. Their results suggest that a reduction in prison
sentences actually reduced recidivism. Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2013) use Argentinian
judges’ ideological differences as an instrument in evaluating the effectiveness of electronic
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monitoring compared to incarceration. They find that this more lenient treatment reduces
recidivism. Green and Winik (2010) and Aizer and Doyle (2015) exploit the random assignment of criminals to judges with different incarceration tendencies (an identification strategy
pioneered by Kling (2006)) and find that juvenile imprisonment increases recidivism probabilities and has adverse effects on human capital accumulation. In the arena of traffic
violations, DeAngelo and Hansen (2014) show that a mass layoff of Oregon State Police in
2003 was associated with large increases in accidents and traffic fatalities. In a separate
study, Hansen (2015) exploits blood alcohol content (BAC) cutoffs that determine whether
a transgression is treated as a driving under the influence (DUI) offense, or even an aggravated DUI offense. His regression discontinuity results suggest that getting caught behind
the wheel with a BAC just above the DUI threshold reduces recidivism by 17 percent.
My study is similar in spirit in that it exploits an exogenous increase in the severity of the
penalty for a speeding offense to isolate the causal effect of a 1-month license suspension on
repeat offenders. The source of this exogenous variation is an idiosyncrasy in the German
traffic penalty catalogue. This catalogue generally provides for three different types of penalties: money fines, (demerit) points entered into one’s central traffic registry account, and
license suspensions. The degree of the penalty is determined by the seriousness of the offense.
Table 1.1 provides an excerpt from the penalty catalogue, specifically for speeding offenses.
Small transgressions, such as driving 10 km/h over the stipulated speed limit, are fined with
small financial penalties. For more severe transgressions, points in the central traffic registry
are added. The point system in Germany is similar to those in place in most EU countries
and several US states. Points received from different transgressions and different types of
transgressions (speeding, DUIs, running red lights, etc.) accumulate. If a person does not
commit a transgression for two years, then all points are erased. If a person does commit a
transgression within two years, however, new points are added to the existing stock and the
two year expungement period starts afresh. An offender permanently loses her license once
her stock of points rises to 18.1
1

The point system was reformed in May 2014; all information therefore refers to the law prior to this
reform.
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Finally, for severe transgressions, temporary license suspensions are handed out on top of
points and money fines. For instance, a person speeding 45 km/h over the limit will have her
license suspended for 1 month. The penalty catalogue also distinguishes between offenses
that took place on highways and offenses that took place in built-up areas, e.g. residential
neighborhoods. Fines differ in severity for different types of transgressions ranging from
aggravated DUIs to driving without appropriate snow chains.2

The road traffic law (BKatV), which constitutes the legal basis for the penalty catalogue,
also has multiple additional provisions. The legal text is currently in its 87th edition, has
3290 pages, and weighs about five pounds. One additional provision is for “persistent delinquencies.” It maintains that “a temporary license suspension [of usually 1 month] shall
ordinarily be handed out if the operator of a motor vehicle commits a speeding transgression
of at least 26 km/h within 1 year after another speeding transgression of at least 26km/h
has been committed and the corresponding penalty has obtained legal force” (§4 Abs. 2 Satz
2 BKatV; own translation). This provision will henceforth be referred to as the “365-day
rule.” For instance, a person who within a few months is caught twice exceeding the speed
limit on a highway by 28 km/h falls under the 365-day rule and will have her license temporarily revoked even though, according to the penalty catalogue, she should on aggregate
only be fined e160 and receive 6 demerit points (see Table 1.1). Note that the wording of
the provision is tricky. If you read the above text carefully, you will notice that the period,
in which an offender is at risk of falling under the 365-day rule, only begins after the penalty
for the first transgression “has obtained legal force.” The difference between the date of the
transgression and the date on which the associated penalty obtains legal force might seem
minor at first yet the median difference between those two dates is 66 days. In other words,
the day count which determines whether an offender has her license suspended due to the
365-day rule does not start immediately after committing the first transgression but with a
substantial time lag. This wrinkle in the law is a big source of confusion among offenders
2

The current version of the German penalty catalogue for traffic offenses can be found at
http://www.kba.de
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and - as we will see in Section 1.4 - prevents sorting to the right of the 365-day cutoff. Fortunately, both the date of a transgressions and the date on which the corresponding penalties
obtain legal force are recorded in the data, so I can properly ascertain which offenders fall
under the rule.
The 365-day rule provides a cutoff that can be exploited in a regression discontinuity setting. For instance, this rule requires that a person who commits her second transgression
within 365 days after the penalty for the initial transgression has obtained legal force, should
have her licenses suspended for one month. A person who commits her second transgression
on day 366 should keep her license. By comparing the recidivism behavior of these two groups
of people, who should be very similar except for the degree of the penalty they receive, I can
obtain an unbiased estimate of the effect of a 1-month driver’s license suspension.
My identification strategy rests on two assumptions that need to be met to guarantee
internally valid estimates. First, drivers by and large must not be aware of this regulation
or, at the very least, they should not gear their driving behavior accordingly. For instance,
this assumption would be violated if drivers drove more recklessly once 365 days have passed
since the penalty for a previous major speeding transgression obtained legal force. In Section 1.4, I will test this assumption. The data will support this assumption and will show
that sorting to either side of the 365-day cutoff is not common, most likely because the
wording of the provision is not straightforward and the rule is somewhat obscure. Second,
traffic authorities must enforce this regulation. It is apparent from the above quote that the
authorities only “shall ordinarily” hand out licenses suspension and thus have considerable
wiggle room. But, Section 1.4 will also show that the authorities to a great degree adhere to
this rule, thus creating a discontinuity in the assignment of drivers to license suspensions.

1.3

Data

The source of data for this study is the German central traffic registry (“Verkehrszentralregister” or VZR). The VZR is administered and maintained by the Federal Motor Transport
Authority (“Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt” or KBA) which is based in Flensburg, Germany. The
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VZR contains an account with a unique ID for every traffic offender who has committed a
transgression that was sanctioned with at least one demerit point. Offenses are usually first
recorded by local traffic authorities. These local agencies then transmit information on the
date and type of transgression as well as the corresponding penalty to the KBA. In some
instances, this information is transmitted by the courts rather than local traffic agencies.
The transmissions also contain information about the offender’s sex, age, state of residence,
as well as the date on which a penalty obtains legal force.
The VZR is an active registry. Persons who do not commit a traffic transgression for two
years not only get their points total set to zero, but are erased entirely from the data base.3
If someone commits a transgression after her account has been erased due to this 2-year expungement period, she starts with a clean slate. That is, she receives a new ID and cannot be
linked to former VZR entries. The VZR was digitalized in 1999. Offenders who have entries
dating back beyond 1999 that have not been expunged yet, are still administered using paper
files. For this study only offenders who are administered using digital files (and thus show
up in the data base) could be used. While every citizen has a right to enquire his point total,
the data in the VZR are usually not made available to outside researchers. What is more,
new entries and deletions changes the composition of the VZR everyday. Fortunately, the
point system was reformed on 1 May 2014. On this occasion, a dataset containing the digital
VZR population as of 30 April 2014 was created. The KBA kindly made an anonymized
version of this excerpt available to me for on-site analysis. The data set contains more than
10.5 million entries pertaining to about 6.3 million distinct offenders.
Obviously not all observations in this dataset can be used for this study. For one, a sufficiently large follow-up period is required since my main outcome of interest is recidivism. For
example, transgressions that occurred on April 29th 2014 cannot be used for this analysis
due to the lack of a follow-up period. More importantly, this study tries to isolate exogeneous variation in the severity of punishment to assess the effect of license suspensions on
3

This expungement rule was changed during the 2014 reform of the VZR. Now, each offense is associated
with a unique expungement period depending on the severity of the offense. In this study only data pre-dating
this reform are used.
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recidivism. This exogeneous shock is induced by the above mentioned 365-day rule, so only
offenders who have a chance to be affected by this rule should be used for analysis. The
following steps describe the selection process that identifies observations that become part
of my “experiment.”
First, it should be noted that the 365-day rule only applies to speeding transgressions of
26km/h or more. More precisely, a 1-month license suspension may be imposed on speeders
whose offense by itself would not have resulted in a license suspensions. As can be seen from
Table 1.1, there are two cases that qualify for this rule: speeding 26-40 km/h above the limit
on highways and speeding 26-30 km/h above the limit in built-up areas. Second, the rule
can only affect persons who have previously committed another speeding transgression of
26km/h or more. Throughout this article, I will refer to the earlier of these two transgressions as the “original transgression” and the second transgression will be referred to as the
“treatment transgression.” When I refer to the time difference between the treatment and
the original transgression, I am referring to the number of days that have passed between
the date on which the penalty for the original transgression obtained legal force and the date
of the treatment transgression. In other words, throughout this paper, I account for the
wrinkle in the law that delays the start of the day count. Only persons who have both an
original transgression and a treatment transgression (i.e. two speeding offenses of 26km/h or
more) can enter the final “discontinuity sample”. I also require the time difference between
both transgressions to be no more than 545 days and at least 186 days.4 In essence, this
puts a 180-day window around the 365-day threshold that determines whether a 1-month
driver’s license suspension is issued. I will assess the robustness of my results to different
time windows around the cutoff in Section 1.5.
The outcome of interest is recidivism, i.e. the probability of committing yet another (third)
offense. This by itself requires a sufficiently large post-treatment time window. This time
window has to be even larger since it can take a few months for transgressions to show
up in the data. For example, offenders may appeal against prescribed penalties in court.
4

Again, this is accounting for the lag caused by the time that passes between the day of the original
transgression and the day on which the penalty for this transgression has obtained legal force.
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Transmission to the KBA and recording information into the VZR also takes some time. On
average, it takes about two months from the date of the actual offense until it shows up in
the data base, after 5 months more than 99% of incidents actually show up in the data. My
observational period ends on 30 April 2014. Accounting for an at-most 5 month delay and in
order to evaluate a 12 months recidivism window, only offenders who have committed their
treatment transgression before 1 December 2012 can be used in this analysis.
Another complication arises from the 2-year expungement period. Individuals who do not
commit a traffic transgression for two years are erased from the data set. By inversion,
individuals who still are in the data base must have committed an offense in the past two
years. That is, individuals who committed an offense before 1 May 2012 must necessarily
have committed another offense subsequently. For these individuals there will thus be no
variation in the outcome. As a result, individuals whose treatment transgression predates
May 1 2012 also need to be excluded from the discontinuity sample.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the generation of my final sample. Only observations who have their
treatment transgression within the dashed frame (1 May 2012 or later, but before 1 December 2012) can be used for the analysis. Take person A at the top of the graph whose
transgressions over time are illustrated by triangles. This person has a transgression within
the framed time period, but this is her original transgression, not her treatment transgression.
Her (second) treatment transgression is outside the dashed frame, as indicated by a second
triangle. Moreover, this person reoffends as there is yet another triangle further to the right.
I would most likely fail to observe this recidivism event, however, since it takes place after 1
December 2013 and thus may not yet show up in the data. Person A is therefore excluded
from my sample. Person B, on the other hand, will be included in the sample. Her treatment
transgression falls into the framed area, giving me a sufficiently large time-window to detect
recdivating behavior. In this instance, person B indeed recidivates within 12 months which I
observe. Person C is similar and will also be included in my sample. The main difference to
person B is that person C does not recidivate. Since I allow for a sufficiently large follow-up
period, I can be sure that as a matter of fact there was no further transgression in the year
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following the treatment transgression. In other words, the lack of another offense for this
person is not due to lagged reporting. Finally, person D and everyone else who has their
treatment transgression prior to 1 May 2012, by virtue of the expungement period, must
necessarily have recidivated. Otherwise, they would no longer be in the sample. That is,
there is no variation in the outcome for these observations, leading me to drop person D.
Once these restrictions have been imposed, a “discontinuity sample” emerges. It consists
of 31,400 persons. Each person has a treatment transgression that occurred between 1 May
2012 and 30 November 2012; each person also has a original transgression for which the
date on which the corresponding penalty has obtained legal force predates the date of the
treatment transgression by at least 186 days and at most 545 days. For about half the
sample, 365 days or less passed between these two points in time. Borrowing terminology
from the potential outcome framework (Angrist et al., 1996), these observations constitute
the “treatment group”. Members of this group fall under the 365-day-rule and should have
their licenses suspended for 1 month. The remainder of the discontinuity sample constitute
the “control group”. Members of this group have committed similar transgressions but due
to the timing of their offenses mostly retain their driver’s license. Persons in both treatment
and control group may or may not recidivate, i.e. may or may not have committed a (third)
major traffic transgression after their treatment transgressions.
If the descriptive statistics of Table 1.2 are any indication, it appears as if license suspensions have an effect. Rates of recidivism are 24.4% and 26.5% for the treatment and control
group, respectively. These differences are statistically significant at the 1% level (see row 10
and columns (1) and (2) of Table 1.2). The difference actually tends to increase the more I
limit the sample to observations with treatment transgressions closer to the 365-day cutoff.
On the other hand, demographic factors that are reported with the data are quite balanced
across treatment and control group, indicating a quasi-random separation of the sample.
For instance, the average age in the treatment sample is 42.66 years, in the control sample
it is 43.02. The null hypothesis that there is no difference in means cannot be rejected at
the 1% level. The means for all other covariates are also very similar, and formal t-tests for
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differences in means fail to reject the null in the vast majority of instances.
I also distinguish between speeding-specific recidivism and general recidivism. The bottom two rows of Table 1.2 provide the corresponding means and standard deviations. Since
1-month license suspensions are quasi-randomly assigned due to a speeding incidence, one
might hypothesize that speeding recidivism is particularly deterred. Therefore a dummy is
defined that equals one if another speeding transgression occurs after the treatment transgression. The equivalent dummy for general recidivism is equal to one if any transgression
(DUI, speeding, running a red light,...) is recorded in the post-treatment period.

1.4

Methods

The goal of this study is to exploit the exogeneous variation in penalties induced by the
365-day rule. The rule maintains that a 1-month license suspension shall be levied on offenders who - accounting for the wrinkle in the law that delays the start of the day count commit two major speeding transgressions within 365 days, but not on those who commit
two such transgressions within 366 days or more. This will allow for the identification of
the causal effect of a temporary license suspension on the probability of reoffending. My
identification strategy will only be valid if the 365-day rule is actually applied and results
in a discontinuity in the assignment to treatment. Figure 1.2 illustrates that this is indeed
the case. The x-axis shows the running variable, i.e. the number of days that have passed
between the date on which the penalty for the original transgression has obtained legal force
and the date of the treatment transgression. For each bin, I calculate the fraction of offenders within that bin who have had their license suspended for 1 month. The position of each
point relative to the y-axis yields information about these fractions.
If the 365-day rule was strictly applied, everybody to the left of the red vertical line should
have her license suspended for 1 month in addition to the prescribed money and point penalties. Everybody to the right or on the line should keep their license and merely suffer the
prescribed money and point penalties. Such a “sharp” separation into treatment and control
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group is not present in this case. There is, however, a big drop in the probability of having
one’s license temporary revoked at day 366. To the left of the cutoff around three quarters
of offenders lose their license for 1 month and to the right of the cutoff a mere 1.7 percent
of offenders are hit with a 1-month license suspension. In other words, there is a huge drop
in the probability of having one’s license suspended due to the treatment transgression once
365 days have passed since the penalty for the original transgression obtained legal force.
Likely reasons for receiving the treatment on the “wrong” side of the cutoff are involvement in an accident or repeat offending in terms of non-speeding transgressions.5 In such
instances, the local traffic authorities may mandate a temporary license suspension. The
reasons for imperfect compliance on the left hand side are numerous. In instances very close
to the cutoff, local traffic authorities or judges may be lenient and choose to not invoke the
365-day rule. In cases of hardship, for example elderly or disabled drivers who have no other
means of transportation than their vehicles, local traffic authorities or judges may also be
lenient. Similarly, offenders from rural areas, commuters who are dependent on their car,
or professional truck drivers might be able to keep their licenses. In general, any penalty
notice can be appealed in court and judges may override a suspension if the offender shows
remorse or accepts a higher monetary and/or point penalty in lieu of the temporary license
suspension.6
By and large, traffic authorities follow the 365-day rule which induces a big drop in the
probability of having one’s license temporarily suspended at the expected threshold. It makes
sense, therefore, to take a look at the relationship between the outcomes and the running
variable. Figure 1.3 plots the two recidivism outcomes of interest against the number of
days that have passed between the date on which the penalty for the original transgression
obtained legal force and the date of the treatment transgression. The running variable is
5

Cases in which exactly 366 days have passed between the original transgresion and the treatment transgressions have their licenses suspended more frequently than most other cases to the right of the cutoff. A
likely reason is that 2012 was a leap year which may have led to confusion among the local traffic authorities
as to whether these cases should fall under the 365-day rule.
6
Note that this kind of selection issue is not a threat to my identification strategy. Rather it illustrates
the local interpretation of any regression discontinuity coefficient. This issue will be further discussed in
Section 1.7.
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aggregated into 3-day bins. The size of each circle indicates the number of observations in
each bin. The position of each circle, relative to the y-axis, indicates the fraction of offenders within a bin who recidivated within 12 months. The recidivism period is extended to
13 months for those who actually have had their license suspended for 1 month in order
to account for incapacitation effects as drivers without a license naturally have less of an
opportunity to reoffend.
In Figure 1.3a there is clearly a discontinuity at the 366-day cutoff. This jump yields a
first rough estimate of the reduced form (intent-to-treat) effect. The graph suggests that
offenders who are assigned to treatment (i.e. license suspensions) are three to four percentage points less likely to recidivate than offenders who are not assigned to treatment. Figure
1.3b focuses on speeding recidivism. Here the discontinuity is less obvious, but there still
appears to be a jump of about 2 percentage points at the 366-day threshold. Note that the
lowess lines in both figures are merely superimposed to better visualize the pattern in the
data but may very well suffer from boundary bias close to the 365-day cutoff. In order to
obtain a visual estimate of the size of the treatment effect it is more important to focus on
the position of the cloud of points, especially around the cutoff, than to study the position
of the lowess lines at the boundary.
Figures 1.2 and 1.3 make a compelling case that a) the 365-day rule invokes a quasi-random
assignment of license suspensions and b) this assignment indeed has an effect on future recidivism behavior. However, the internal validity of any coefficient obtained through this
setup would be in jeopardy if offenders were very much aware of the 365-day cutoff and
geared their driving behavior accordingly. Fortunately, there is little indication that this
is the case. First, anecdotal evidence suggests that the vast majority of drivers is not even
aware that this rule exists. There is a vast amount of online forums in which repeat offenders
who fall under the 365-day rule express their shock about their license suspensions. Second,
the wrinkle in the provision that starts the day count only after the penalty for the original
transgression has obtained legal force, makes it hard for offenders to keep track of whether
they are still at risk of falling under the 365-day rule. That is, if they were aware of the
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exact wording of the law to begin with.
Data back up this claim. If at least some drivers were aware of the 365-day rule and all its
wrinkles, and were able to keep track of the exact day count, one would expect “bunching”
on the right-hand side of the 365-day cutoff. Drivers would drive more carefully than usual
until the 365-day rule no longer applied to them. This would result in a spike of traffic
transgressions on days 366-400. Yet Figure 1.4 gives little indication that this is indeed the
case. The frequency of treatment transgressions (in 3-day bins) is very evenly distributed
with around 100 transgressions per day on each side of the cutoff. Most notably, there is no
spike in treatment transgressions from offenders whose penalties for their original transgression obtained legal force just a bit more than 365 days ago. One might be mildly concerned
about the small drop in the transgression frequency on days 360-362. Yet, the frequency
rebounds to above-average levels on days 363-365. Drops in frequency of even greater magnitude can also be observed elsewhere in the distribution. This visual analysis is consistent
with McCrary’s (2008) more explicit density test for manipulation at the cutoff. The test
implies a log difference in height of -.021 with a standard error of 0.033. In other words,
the null hypothesis that there is no manipulation at the cutoff cannot be rejected at any
reasonable level of significance. Frandsen (2013) has pointed out that McCrary’s (2008)
density test might be inconsistent for discrete running variables, such as the day count in
this application. He has developed a test with preferable finite sample properties for such a
scenario. Frandsen’s (2013) test yields a p-value of 0.224, thus confirming that manipulation
at the cutoff is unlikely. By and large, there is no indication of any bunching or any increase
in frequency just to the right of the cutoff.
A related threat to the internal validity of the design is differential sorting of offenders to
either side of the cutoff. For instance, more experienced drivers could be more aware of the
365-day rule and thus sort to the right of the cutoff. Again, the data give little indication
that this is the case. Figure 1.5a plots the average age for 3-day bins against the running
variable. Age should be a reasonable proxy for driving experience. There is no sign of either
a jump or drop at the cutoff or anywhere else in the distribution. Figure 1.5b repeats this
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exercise treating the percentage of female drivers in each 3-day bin as the outcome. Women
generally commit substantially fewer traffic transgressions. Yet again there is no jump in
the percentage of female offenders at the 366-day cutoff. This suggests that female drivers
are as unaware of the 365-day rule as their male peers.7 Finally, I evaluate the number
of prior offenses in the same way. The idea here is that habitual offenders might be more
knowledgeable of the penalty catalogue and the 365-day provision and might therefore be
more likely to “play” the law. But again, there is little indication of a jump or drop in the
average number of priors, neither around the cutoff nor anywhere else.

Overall, there is no indication of any sorting behavior. This suggests that the 365-day
rule is obscure enough to lead to a random separation of offenders into a treatment and
control group, yet it is enforced to such a degree that the take-up among those who are
assigned to treatment is substantially higher than among those not assigned to treatment.
The treatment here is, of course, a 1-month driver’s license suspension. This gives rise to
a fuzzy regression discontinuity (RD) design which is implemented as a 2SLS instrumental
variable regression. One of the main challenges in this kind of setup is to pick the correct
functional form. This is an important task in all empirical analyses but even more crucial
in a RD setting. We want to be sure that what at first glance certainly looks like a jump
in recidivism rates at the 366-day cutoff is not just a non-linearity in the data. A visual
inspection of a graph that plots the outcome of interest against the running variable (such as
Figure 1.3) provides a useful guide for picking the correct functional form. The graph reveals
no obvious non-linearities. Not least for efficiency reasons, a linear functional form therefore
seems to be appropriate. Nonetheless, I will also consider specifications using second and
third order polynomials of the running variable and interactions of these polynomials with
the treatment dummy. Gelman and Imbens (2014) show that polynomials of even higher
order do more harm than good and even the cubic version of the model might be too much.
7

As noted earlier, the lowess lines are merely included to show general patterns in the data. The small
gap on both sides of the cutoffs is probably due to boundary bias, but there is certainly no discontinuity in
the position of the point cloud.
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It is still useful as a robustness check.
An alternative is a nonparametric approach, e.g. local linear regression (Hahn et al., 2001).
Lee and Card (2008), however, argue that with a discrete running variable, such a nonparametric approach is not advisable. My running variable, the number of days between the
original and the treatment transgression, is discrete but takes on many distinct values which
should mitigate concerns about the nonparametric approach. Nonetheless, this method is
only used as a robustness check. Section 1.6 will show that it leads to results that are strikingly similar to those of the least flexible parametric specification. Lee and Lemieux (2010)
also suggest that the standard errors should be clustered on the distinct values of a discrete
running variable which is done throughout the paper. The second stage regression in my
2SLS model is modeled as follows:
Reci = β0 + β1 Xi + (β2 Xi2 + β3 Xi3 ) + γ0 D̂i + γ1 D̂i Xi (+γ2 D̂i Xi2 + γ3 D̂i Xi3 ) + i

(1.1)

where Xi is the running variable, that is the number of days that have passed between the
date on which the penalty for the original transgression obtained legal force and the date of
the treatment transgression of offender i. As is best practice in an RD setting (Lee, 2008),
the running variable is centered around the cutoff. Di is a dummy indicating whether, due to
the treatment transgression, offender i had her license suspended for 1 month. This dummy
is instrumented for (see below) thus the hat-superscript in equation (1.1). Reci is a dummy
equal to one if offender i recidivates and commits a (third) offense within 12 months after
the treatment transgression.8 γ0 is the coefficient of interest and yields the treatment effect
of a 1-month license suspension on the probability of recidivating within a year. In order to
assess more flexible functional forms, the polynomials and interaction terms in parentheses
can be added to the model. Since assignment to treatment is fuzzy, a first stage regression,
yielding the predicted values D̂i , is necessary:
8

As mentioned above, the evaluated recidivism period is extended to 13 months for those who actually
receive the treatment in order to account for incapacitation effects as drivers without a license naturally have
less of an opportunity to reoffend.
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(1.2)

where Ti = 1(Xi < 366). In other words, Ti indicates assignment to treatment and Di
indicates whether the treatment was in fact taken up. Of course, in the specifications using
higher order polynomials, the first stage is constructed such that the model is exactly identified and { Di , Di Xi , Di Xi2 , Di Xi3 } are instrumented for by { Ti , Ti Xi , Ti Xi2 , Ti Xi3 }.
All models are also run with a vector of covariates included in the regression. Controls
are offender i’s age, sex, her number of prior offenses, and regional dummies for her place
of residence. This provides an additional check on the internal validity of my estimates.
The covariates are balanced across treatment and control group so that the point estimates
should not be affected by the inclusion of control variables. We will see in the next section
that this is indeed the case.

1.5
1.5.1

Results
Reduced Form Results

The reduced form results of Table 1.3 yield the intent-to-treat (ITT) effect, i.e. the effect
of assignment to treatment. Offenders who committed their treatment transgression within
365 days after the penalty for the original transgression had obtained legal force, are about
three percentage points less likely to recidivate within 12 months than offenders who do not
fall under the 365-day rule. This finding is robust to the inclusion of covariates. Changes to
the functional form also have no effect on the point estimates, but result in small losses of
precision. The average rate of recidivism is 25.4 percent, so these coefficients translate into
a decrease in the rate of recidivism of about 12 percent. This result is also consistent with
a visual analysis of Figure 1.3a which illustrates the ITT and would suggest an effect size of
a similar magnitude.
Panel B of Table 1.3 shows the reduced form results with respect to speeding-specific re-
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cidivism. One might expect that future speeding offenses are deterred in particular since
temporary license suspensions are imposed as a result of past speeding transgressions. Column (1) indicates that falling under the 365-day rule reduces the rate of speeding recidivism
by about 2 percentage points. This translates into a reduction in speeding-specific recidivism
of about 11 percent, indicating that speeding-specific recidivism is affected by the penalty
just as much as any other kind of recidivism. This result is robust to including a set of
covariate variables. The result is also consistent with Figure 1.3b which would suggest an
effect of similar magnitude. The point estimate is fairly robust to changes in the functional
form. However, in specifications in which a quadratic or cubic version of the running variable and the corresponding interactions with Ti are included, the standard errors increase
substantially and the coefficient is no longer statistically significantly different from zero.
This is most likely a power issue. I have calculated the minimum detectable effect (MDE)
using the following formula provided by Jacob et al. (2012):
s
M DE = 2.8

(1 − RY2 )σY2
N P (1 − P )(1 − RT2 )

(1.3)

where RY2 and RT2 are obtained from a regression of Reci and Ti , respectively on the running
variable and other covariates. σY2 is the variance in outcome in the control group, N is the
sample size, and P is the proportion of sample members in the treatment group. The MDE
is the smallest treatment effect that my setup has a reasonable chance of detecting. For
speeding recidivism, it is 0.017 which is very close to the point estimates. As a result, we
may have trouble detecting a statistically significant effect on speeding recidivism using specifications with higher order polynomials which are slightly less efficient than the linear setup.9

9

The MDE for recidivism in general is 0.018, so power issues should not be a concern for the main
outcome.
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2SLS Second Stage Results

Instrumental variable estimates for the effect of a 1-month license suspension on the probability of recidivating within 12 months are reported in Table 1.4. The linear model without
any controls suggests that a 1-month license suspension reduces the probability of committing a major traffic transgression within the next year by 5 percentage points. Adding
covariate controls does not alter this point estimate substantially. A model containing an
additional quadratic term of the running variable and its interaction with the suspension
indicator comes to virtually the same result. The coefficient is -.052 with a standard error
of .021, and it is also robust to the inclusion of covariates. The cubic model yields similar
results with a coefficient of -.057 and a standard error of .024. Given a mean recidivism rate
of 25.4 percent, these coefficients translate into reductions of recidivating behavior by 19 to
22 percent.
Columns (3) through (10) assess the robustness of my results to picking an ever smaller
time window around the 365-day cutoff. For instance, column (3) focuses on offenders who
committed their treatment transgression between 276 and 455 days after the penalties for
their original transgressions had obtained legal force. In essence, this creates a 90-day window
to both sides of the 365-day cutoff. It is comforting to see that the point estimates remain
very stable. If we further zoom in on the cutoff, the point estimates continue to hover around
-.05. Not surprisingly, the standard errors inflate substantially as would be expected since
the sample size shrinks with an ever closer window around the cutoff. Wooldridge (2009)
also points out that there are more than just efficiency costs to limiting the sample to observations just around the cutoff. His simulations show that this might substantially bias
the coefficient of interest. Therefore, the results using a smaller time window merely serve
as a robustness check. The specification that uses the full sample (i.e. column (2)) is the
preferred specification.
The selection of a preferred functional form is another challenge in my setting. A visual inspection of Figure 1.3 finds little indication of a non-linear relationship between the running
variable and the outcome. For efficiency reasons, the linear specification might therefore be
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preferred. I also conducted a Chi-Squared (Wald) version of the formal F-test suggested
by Lee and Lemieux (2010). For this test, a set of dummies for 3-day bins of the running
variables is added to the 2SLS regression. It is then tested whether this set of dummies is
jointly significant. If it is not, this is a sign that the original regression (without the bin
dummies) is not underspecified. If the dummies are jointly significant, then higher-order
polynomials of the running variable should be added to better fit the data. The p-values of
this test are reported below each coefficient and standard error pair in Table 1.4. The set
of bin-dummies is insignificant in all specifications, indicating that higher order polynomials
are not needed here. It is nonetheless comforting that both the quadratic and the cubic
specification yield point estimates that are very similar to those of the linear specification.
If we discount the findings from columns (9) and (10) which will likely suffer from both
consistency and efficiency issues, the coefficient range stretches from -0.029 to -0.071 and is
thus hovering around the preferred -.048 estimate yielded by the linear specification using
covariates and the full discontinuity sample.
The second stage results are also strikingly different from the “naive” OLS regression results of Table 1.6. The estimates in this table are based on the population of all of the about
2 million offenders who committed a major traffic violation in Germany between May 2012
and December 2012. Some of these offenses were punished with a temporary license suspension. Here, I also regress a dummy indicating whether a person commits yet another traffic
violation within one year on a dummy indicating whether a person’s license was suspended
following her initial transgression. Column (1) shows that there is a positive relationship
between punishment and recidivism. That is, persons who have had their license suspended
are more likely to recidivate. This relationship is robust to the inclusion of a set of control
variables such as age and sex. Of course, nobody would argue that the “naive” OLS results
document a causal relationship. Drivers who get punished might drive faster cars, be less
risk-averse, or differ from unpunished drivers in many other unobservable dimensions. A simple OLS model fails to pick up these differences between punished and unpunished drivers.
My regression discontinuity design, on the other hand, solves this issue because the 365-day
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rule ensures quasi-random assignment into treatment and control group. The treated who
have their license suspended for 1 month do not differ in terms of either observable or unobservable characteristics from control members of the discontinuity sample who get to keep
their licenses. In other words, the 2SLS regression yields a causal effect whereas the “naive”
OLS merely reflects correlations. The difference between the two approaches turns out to
be very substantial.
The results for speeding-specific recidivism are presented in Table 1.5. A linear model
suggests that a 1-month license suspension due to the treatment transgression reduces the
probability that another speeding offense is committed within 12 months by about 3 percentage points. This effect is statistically significant and robust to the inclusion of covariates.
This translates into a reduction by 17 percent, given a mean rate of speeding-specific recidivism of 18.4 percent. The results for speeding-specific recidivism are, however, much
less robust to changes in specification and adjustments of the period under observation. A
quadratic and cubic model using the full sample yield smaller coefficients of -0.022 and -0.020,
respectively and also lead to much larger standard errors than the linear model. Moreover,
if I zoom in on observations very close to the cutoff, I lose a lot of precision and some of
the point estimates have a positive sign. A series of Wald-test indicates that a linear model
should be the preferred model which makes the statistically significant -0.030 coefficient in
column (2) the most trusted estimate. Nonetheless, their lack of robustness make the results
for speeding-specific recidivism somewhat less reliable.

1.6
1.6.1

Robustness
Nonparametric Regression Results

The parametric approach that was employed in the previous section uses all observations,
each of which carries the same weight regardless of how far away from the cutoff it is. However, the argument that offenders are assigned to treatment in a quasi-random fashion might
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be most credible for observations close to the 365 cutoff. Yet as is apparent from the previous
section, limiting the analysis to observations right around the cutoff leads to both efficiency
and consistency issues. Moreover, if the functional form is correctly specified, including observations that are further away does not lead to bias and improves precision.
Nonparametric techniques offer an alternative estimation approach. Instead of having the
functional form determined by the analyst, a nonparametric approach ultimately lets the
data pick the appropriate functional form. An example for a nonparametric technique is
local linear regression (Hahn et al., 2001) which has some beneficial properties with respect
to boundary bias. The idea here is to fit a weighted regression within a bin with a fixed
bandwidth around the cutoff leading to a flexible fit. Observations that are close to the
cutoff carry more weight than observations further away and, in fact, some observations will
receive zero weight and not enter the analysis. By sidestepping the functional form issues,
local linear regression reduces the chances of bias in the treatment effect. However, it offers
less precision. As mentioned earlier, nonparametric techniques should also be viewed with
more scrutiny when the running variable is discrete. With discrete data, there are no observations with values of the running variable just below the cutoff (e.g. at 365.99 days in this
application). Rather, clusters of observations are bunched together at uniform distances, so
comparing observations “just above” and “just below” the 365-day cutoff and slowly moving
across observations with slightly higher/lower values of the running variable is impossible.
Nonetheless, Calonico et al. (2014) point out that in practice when a discrete running variable has a fair amount of mass near the cutoff, a nonparametric estimation might still yield
a good approximation of the true treatment effect.
The key challenge with nonparametric techniques is bandwidth selection. There is a tradeoff between bias and efficiency with larger bandwidths yielding more precise estimates while
being more susceptible to bias. Several algorithms to pick an optimal bandwidth have been
developed. They all follow a similar pattern: Starting from an initial pilot bandwidth, an
iterative procedure determines an optimal bandwidth that balances the two dimensions of
efficiency and unbiasedness. The two most popular algorithms by Imbens and Kalyanaraman

CHAPTER 1. SPEEDING, PUNISHMENT, AND RECIDIVISM

23

(2011) and Calonico et al. (2014) have been implemented into software programs and are
put to work in this study. Table 1.7 demonstrates that the nonparametric approach yields
results that are strikingly similar to those of the parametric analysis. A 1-month license
suspension due to the treatment transgression is associated with a reduction in recidivating
behavior of 4.6 percentage points. Recall that the preferred parametric specification (column (2) in Table 1.4) predicted a reduction by 4.8 percentage points. The point estimate is
identical regardless of the algorithm that was used for bandwidth selection. Table 1.7 also
gives information on the number of observations in the sample that receive non-zero weights.
While the algorithm by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2011) makes use of more than 85% of
observations, the algorithm by Calonico et al. (2014) uses only about half the sample. This
also explains differences in precision. Figure 1.6a further attests to the non-sensitivity of my
nonparametric results to the bandwidth choice; it shows the point estimates and 95% confidence intervals over a wide range of possible bandwidth selections, including those suggested
by the above mentioned procedures. The point estimates all hover around -.05 and most of
them are statistically significant at the 5% level.
For speeding recidivism, the nonparametric results also resemble the preferred parametric
results. In fact, the point estimate in column (4) of Table 1.7 is identical to the one in column
(1) of Table 1.5. Of course, the nonparametric estimates are less precise as they are based on
fewer observations. Nevertheless, the similarity in results lends additional credibility to the
preferred parametric specification which predicts a reduction in speeding-recidivism by about
3 percentage points. Furthermore, Figure 1.6b shows that the nonparametric estimates are
relatively robust to the bandwidth choice with the point estimates all falling within the -0.03
range.
Even though they should be taken with a grain of salt since, due to the discreteness of the
running variable, it is very comforting that, by and large, the nonparametric results yield
results very similar to those of the preferred parametric regression specification.
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Recidivism Windows

In this section, I look at a variety of recidivism time windows. For one, this provides an
additional robustness check and tests whether my results are sensitive to small changes in
the recidivism time period under consideration. Second, it allows me to assess whether a
temporary license suspension deters offenders permanently from committing further transgressions or whether over time they revert to their old behavior. It should be noted that the
data put some restrictions on the length of recidivism time windows that can be evaluated.
Section 1.3 and Figure 1.1 have explained the data selection process in detail. The 2-year
expungement period and the lag between transgression date and data entry date put a bind
on this type of analysis. The maximum recidivism period that the data allows me to reasonably evaluate is 15 months. In this analysis, offenders who committed their treatment
transgression between August and November 2012 are dropped from the sample. They may
have recidivated within 15 months but their transgression might not show up in the data due
to the delay in reporting.10 Obviously such a focus on longer recidivism windows also leads
to substantial reductions in the sample size. On the other hand, evaluating smaller time
windows allows me to use additional observations thus adding precision. It should be noted
that the treated group is not forced to turn their licenses in right away. Rather, they have
to deposit their license for one month at the local traffic authority within 4 months of the
date on which the punishment takes legal effect. Accounting for an additional month that
may be required to remind offenders that they are due to turn in their license, the smallest
time window available for evaluation is thus 6 months.
A simple comparison of point estimates for different recidivism windows would be flawed
since the average rate of recidivism fluctuates accordingly. For instance, the average 6-month
recidivism rate is about 16 percent whereas the average 15-month recidivism rate is about 33
percent. A coefficient of, say -0.08, would thus indicate a 50 percent reduction in 6-months
recidivism rates but merely a roughly 25 percent reduction in 15-month recidivism. Figure
1.7 therefore shows means-adjusted coefficients and confidence intervals for recidivism win10

The recidivism window for offenders who lose their license for 1 month in this instance is 16 months to
account for incapacitation effects.
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dows ranging from six to fifteen months. That is, the coefficients and confidence intervals
are divided by the corresponding average recidivism rate. All results are obtained from a
set of linear parametric regressions using covariates. The effect of a temporary license suspension is notably stable over time although the effect size is slightly larger for longer time
windows. As would be expected, the point estimates also become less precise the longer
the time window under evaluation as the number of available observations decreases. For
all time-windows, the point estimates are negative and significantly different from zero. By
and large, Figure 1.7a indicates that a 1-month license suspension reduces both short-run
and long-run rates of recidivism by about 20 percent. This is not due to a short-run incapacitation effect but rather suggests that offenders “learn their lesson” and are permanently
deterred from committing traffic transgressions.
The same exercise is repeated for speeding-specific recidivism. Figure 1.7b presents the
means-adjusted point estimates along with confidence intervals. The effect range is similar;
The standard errors are slightly larger than for the general recidivism outcome. The long-run
effects appear to be slightly larger than short-run effects, although these differences are not
statistically significant. By and large, this graph indicates that future speeding transgressions were not deterred more than other offenses. In fact, both effect sizes and the pattern
of slightly, but not statistically significantly, larger long-term effects are quite similar across
Figures 1.7a and 1.7b. This similarity and the general persistence of the effect also indicate
that the reduction in recidivism is not driven by the fact that the treatment group - as a
result of being punished under the 365-days rule - simply becomes better informed about
the peculiarities of the 365-days rule.

1.7

Discussion and Conclusion

The impact of punishment on future criminal behavior has always been very hard to measure. Heavy penalties are usually only handed out to offenders who have committed serious
crimes. Their recidivism rates are higher to begin with and the effect of punishment cannot
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easily be distinguished from the effect of unobservable characteristics of these offenders such
as a lower risk aversion or self-control issues. This article has exploited a special provision in
the German traffic law that results in a quasi-random assignment of 1-month driver’s license
suspensions to some traffic offenders but not to others. Using a fuzzy discontinuity design,
I find that receiving the punishment reduces the probability of committing another offense
within a year by about 20 percent. In other words, temporary license suspensions have a
large deterrent effect.
This, of course, is a “local” effect in two ways. First, it is local in the sense that the estimated effect is best interpreted as the effect on offenders with values of the running variable
close to the 365-day cutoff. Yet, as the summary statistics in Table 1.2 show, there are few
observable differences between offenders close and further away from the cutoff which leaves
some room for generalizations. Second, a fuzzy RD design is implemented using instrumental variable analysis. As a result, I obtain a Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE), i.e.
the effect for compliers. This is the group of people who, only because they fell under the
365-day rule, had their license suspended for one month but would not have had their license
suspended otherwise. The 365-day rule by its very nature only applies to repeat offenders
who have committed two fairly serious speeding offenses. A 1-month license suspension may
affect other types of offenders, e.g. first-time offenders, in a different way. The population of
habitual offenders is, however, clearly the population that is the most interesting to policy
makers so that my results might very well be seen as a case of “sometimes-you-get-whatyou-want” (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). After all, it is exactly this group of repeat offenders
committing fairly major transgressions that is most likely to actually get penalized with temporary license suspensions. My study obtains the treatment effects for this very population.
One may also speculate that the deterrent effect for less habitual offenders might be even
larger, making my estimates a lower bound for the effect of license suspensions on first-time
offenders and offenders committing less severe transgressions.
The results of this article also have implications for the economic theory of crime. License
suspensions due to the 365-day rule have no effect on the degree of penalties for future
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transgressions. As a result, they should not have an effect on the cost-benefit trade-off
that rational criminals face in Becker’s (1974) framework. Yet, this study provides some
compelling evidence that receiving such a penalty deeply alters future behavior. My findings could be reconciled with Becker’s (1974) model if suffering a 1-month license suspension
prompts offenders, who only then realize the true costs of the penalty, to revise their expected
cost estimate upwards. This kind of “learning” behavior is also consistent with economic
models of crime in behavioral economics. Finally, the findings of this study are of great
interest to policy makers who, as of now, have very little reliable evidence regarding the
effectiveness of penalties that are levied on traffic offenders. This article suggests that temporary license suspensions for traffic offenders are an effective tool in reducing major traffic
violations. Incorporating this insight into future revisions of the penalty catalogue should
help prevent some of the thousands of traffic fatalities that happen everyday.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1.1: Excerpt from the German Traffic Penalty Catalogue: Speeding Offenses
Transgression by:
≤ 10 km/h
11 - 15 km/h
16 - 20 km/h
21 - 25 km/h
26 - 30 km/h
31 - 40 km/h
41 - 50 km/h
51 - 60 km/h
61 - 70 km/h
≥ 71 km/h

Penalization
Highways
Built-Up Areas
10e
15e
20e
25e
30e
35e
70e, 1P
80e, 1P
80e, 3P
100e, 3P
120e, 3P
160e, 3P, 1M
160e, 3P, 1M
200e, 4P, 1M
240e, 4P, 1M
280e, 4P, 2M
440e, 4P, 2M
480e, 4P, 3M
600e, 4P, 3M
680e, 4P, 3M

Each cell contains information on the penalization for speeding offenses. There are three types of penalties: Fines as
measured in Euros (e), central registry points (P), and temporary license suspensions in months (M). A person who has
accumulated 18 points will have her license revoked permanently. All points are erased if a person remains without a
traffic transgression for 2 years.
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274.46*
(51.48)
42.66
(13.12)
0.162*
(0.368)
2.014
(1.224)
0.227
(0.419)
0.208
(0.406)
0.179
(0.383
0.366
(0.482)
0.0200
(0.140
0.244*
(0.430)
0.175*
(0.380)
16,876

451.69*
(52.28)
43.02
(12.93)
0.148*
(0.355)
2.004
(1.183)
0.230
(0.421)
0.209
(0.406)
0.169
(0.375)
0.372
(0.483)
0.0201
(0.140)
0.265*
(0.442)
0.193*
(0.395)
14,524

319.54*
(25.84)
42.88
(13.15)
0.167*
(0.373)
2.000
(1.194)
0.231
(0.422)
0.208
(0.406)
0.178
(0.383)
0.363
(0.481)
0.0191
(0.137)
0.241*
(0.428)
0.174*
(0.380)
8,321

409.44*
(25.95)
42.93
(12.94)
0.144*
(0.351)
2.018
(1.207)
0.235
(0.424)
0.207
(0.405)
0.166
(0.372)
0.371
(0.483)
0.0201
(0.140)
0.268*
(0.443)
0.195*
(0.396)
7,771

(3)
(4)
±90 days
[276-365] [366-455]
334.80*
(17.32)
42.78
(13.15)
0.167
(0.373)
1.986
(1.185)
0.227
(0.419)
0.212
(0.409)
0.176
(0.381)
0.366
(0.482)
0.0183*
(0.134)
0.240*
(0.427)
0.178*
(0.383)
5,464

395.02*
(17.19)
42.85
(13.04)
0.146
(0.353)
2.019
(1.214)
0.237
(0.425)
0.208
(0.406)
0.168
(0.374)
0.367
(0.482)
0.0194*
(0.138)
0.267*
(0.442)
0.194*
(0.396)
5,310

(5)
(6)
±60 days
[306-365] [366-425]
350.42*
(8.650)
42.84
(13.01)
0.158
(0.365)
1.995
(1.208)
0.217
(0.413)
0.222
(0.415)
0.170
(0.376)
0.370
(0.483)
0.0217
(0.146)
0.229*
(0.420)
0.175
(0.381)
2,621

380.59*
(8.691)
42.88
(13.33)
0.148
(0.356)
1.993
(1.223)
0.237
(0.425)
0.208
(0.406)
0.170
(0.375)
0.364
(0.481)
0.0209
(0.143)
0.265*
(0.442)
0.195
(0.397)
2,730

(7)
(8)
±30 days
[336-365] [366-395]
360.43*
(2.964)
42.85
(12.91)
0.150
(0.358)
1.947
(1.185)
0.220
(0.415)
0.190
(0.392)
0.168
(0.374)
0.399
(0.490)
0.0230
(0.150)
0.232
(0.423)
0.182
(0.387)
869

370.53*
(2.813)
42.58
(13.42)
0.155
(0.362)
2.003
(1.225)
0.241
(0.428)
0.212
(0.409)
0.170
(0.376)
0.364
(0.481)
0.0132
(0.114)
0.255
(0.437)
0.182
(0.388)
905

(9)
(10)
±10 days
[356-365] [366-375]

Table of means, standard deviations in parentheses. Data source is the digital German traffic registry database as of 30 April 2014. Columns (1) and (2) show
descriptive statistics for the full analysis sample. In columns (3) and (4) descriptive statistics are listed for observations which have values in the running variable
that fall into a 90 day window on either side of the 365-day cutoff. Columns (5) to (10) show means and standard deviations for observations with running variable
values that are ever closer to the cutoff; *denotes a statistically significant difference in means at the 1% level.

Observations

Recidivism (Speeding)

Recidivism (Any)

Foreign

West

East

North

South

Num. Priors

Female

Age

Time

(1)
(2)
Full Sample
[186-365] [366-545]

Table 1.2: Summary Statistics
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Table 1.3: Reduced Form Regression Results
(1)
Panel A: Recidivism (Any)
Below Cutoff
Panel B: Recidivism (Speeding)
Below Cutoff

Observations
Convariates
Model

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

−0.033∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗
(0.009)
(0.009)

−0.033∗∗∗
(0.012)

−0.031∗∗ −0.032∗∗ −0.032∗∗
(0.012)
(0.014)
(0.014)

−0.020∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗
(0.008)
(0.008)

−0.014
(0.011)

−0.013
(0.011)

−0.010
(0.012)

−0.010
(0.012)

31,400
No
Quadratic

31,383
Yes
Quadratic

31,400
No
Cubic

31,383
Yes
Cubic

31,400
No
Linear

31,383
Yes
Linear

Notes: ∗ ∗ ∗/ ∗ ∗/∗ indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by distinct values of the running variable.
Each column reports coefficients and standard errors from the reduced form OLS regression. Dependent variable in
Panel A is a dummy indicating whether a person commits any traffic offense within a year of her (second) treatment
transgression. Dependent variable in Panel B is a dummy indicating whether a person commits another speeding
offense within a year of her (second) treatment transgression. “Below Cutoff” is the main explanatory variable and
is a dummy equal to one if the treatment transgression occurred within 365 days of the day on which the penalty for
the original transgression had obtained legal force. Such a person is very likely to have her license suspended for 1
month.

0.9934
−0.057∗∗
(0.024)
0.9962
No
31,400

p-Value Wald Test:
Convariates
Observations

0.9836
No
16,092

0.9996
−0.047
(0.036)
1.000
Yes
16,086

0.9992
−0.049
(0.034)
0.9854
No
10,774

0.9519
−0.053
(0.034)
0.9879
Yes
10,769

0.9479
−0.050
(0.033)
0.7882
No
5,351

0.3301
−0.037
(0.085)

0.3196
−0.055
(0.052)

0.8149
Yes
5,347

0.3665
−0.029
(0.074)

0.3725
−0.052
(0.049)

0.9865
No
1,774

0.8733
0.204
(0.475)

0.8379
−0.092
(0.079)

−0.078
(0.060)

0.9998
Yes
1,774

0.8612
0.265
(0.603)

0.7889
−0.084
(0.075)

−0.082
(0.054)

0.244
(0.183)

(9)
(10)
±10 days

Notes: ∗ ∗ ∗/ ∗ ∗/∗ indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by distinct values of the running variable.
Each column reports coefficients and standard errors from the second stage of a 2SLS instrumental variable regression. The outcome variable is a dummy
equal to one if a person commits another major traffic transgression within 1 year after her treatment transgression. Coefficients are displayed for the main
explanatory variable, a dummy indicating a 1-month license suspension following the treatment transgression. This dummy was instrumented for using a
variable for whether the treatment transgression occurred within 365 days of the day on which the penalty for the original transgression had obtained legal
force. In columns (1) and (2), the entire discontinuity sample enters the analysis. In columns (3) and (4) only observations with values of the running
variable within a 90-day time-window on either side of the 365-day cutoff were used. Columns (5) through (10) further limit the sample. If indicated,
controls for sex, age, the number of prior offenses and a set of dummies for the region of residence were included.
The reported p-values correspond to Wald specification tests. Small p-values indicate that a model is not appropriate and higher order polynomials of the
running variable should be added to the regression equation.

0.9977
Yes
31,383

0.9895
−0.057∗∗
(0.023)

0.9377
−0.071∗∗
(0.029)

−0.053∗∗
(0.026)

0.247
(0.186)

(7)
(8)
±30 days

−0.059∗∗∗ −0.059∗∗∗ −0.052∗
(0.021)
(0.021)
(0.027)

0.254
(0.187)

(5)
(6)
±60 days

0.9859
0.9785
0.9417
−0.071∗∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗ −0.069∗∗
(0.026)
(0.025)
(0.030)

p-Value Wald Test:
Cubic

0.9169
−0.050∗∗
(0.020)

0.9159
−0.052∗∗
(0.021)

p-Value Wald Test:
Squared

.254
(0.184)

−0.051∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗
(0.014)
(0.014)
(0.019)
(0.019)

0.254
(0.183)

(3)
(4)
±90 days

Linear

Mean Recidivism
(SD)

(1)
(2)
Full Sample

Table 1.4: Treatment Effects by Specification and Time Window - Recidivism (Any)
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0.8774
−0.023
(0.018)
0.9919
−0.019
(0.020)
0.9758
No
31,400

p-Value Wald-Test:
Squared

p-Value Wald-Test:
Cubic

p-Value Wald-Test:
Convariates
Observations

0.9977
No
16,092

0.9986
0.019
(0.031)

0.9799
−0.045∗∗
(0.022)

−0.019
(0.017)

1.000
Yes
16,086

0.9974
0.018
(0.031)

0.9646
−0.045∗∗
(0.022)

−0.019
(0.017)

0.185
(0.388)

(3)
(4)
±90 days

0.9993
No
10,774

0.9722
0.005
(0.029)

0.9551
−0.006
(0.026)

−0.035∗
(0.018)

0.9993
Yes
10,769

0.9696
0.008
(0.030)

0.9514
−0.006
(0.026)

−0.035∗∗
(0.018)

0.187
(0.390)

(5)
(6)
±60 days

0.8224
No
5,351

0.4896
0.037
(0.055)

0.4606
0.012
(0.040)

−0.011
(0.024)

0.9218
Yes
5,347

0.5043
0.044
(0.049)

0.5001
0.012
(0.040)

−0.011
(0.023)

0.186
(0.389)

(7)
(8)
±30 days

0.9578
No
1,774

0.9652
0.052
(0.152)

0.9505
0.019
(0.046)

−0.010
(0.041)

0.9544
Yes
1,774

0.9750
0.072
(0.174)

0.9473
0.019
(0.046)

−0.011
(0.039)

0.183
(0.387)

(9)
(10)
±10 days

Notes: ∗ ∗ ∗/ ∗ ∗/∗ indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by distinct values of the running variable.
Each column reports coefficients and standard errors from the second stage of a 2SLS instrumental variable regression. The outcome variable is a dummy
equal to one if a person commits another major speeding offense within 1 year after her treatment transgression. Coefficients are displayed for the main
explanatory variable, a dummy indicating a 1-month license suspension following the treatment transgression. This dummy was instrumented for using a
variable for whether the treatment transgression occurred within 365 days of the day on which the penalty for the original transgression had obtained legal
force. In columns (1) and (2), the entire discontinuity sample enters the analysis. In columns (3) and (4) only observations with values of the running
variable within a 90-day time-window on either side of the 365-day cutoff were used. Columns (5) through (10) further limit the sample. If indicated,
controls for sex, age, the number of prior offenses and a set of dummies for the region of residence were included.
The reported p-values correspond to Wald specification tests . Small p-values indicate that a model is not appropriate and higher order polynomials of the
running variable should be added to the regression equation.

0.9756
Yes
31,383

0.9851
−0.020
(0.019)

0.8470
−0.022
(0.018)

−0.031∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗
(0.012)
(0.012)

0.184
(0.387)

Linear

Mean Recidivism
(SD)

(1)
(2)
Full Sample

Table 1.5: Treatment Effects by Specification and Time Window - Speeding Recidivism
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Table 1.6: Naive OLS - Effect of License Suspension on Recidivism
(1)
Suspension

(2)
∗∗∗

0.010
(0.001)

Female
Age

Observations
State Dummies

2,170,728
No

(3)
∗∗

0.002
(0.001)
−0.074∗∗∗
(0.001)
−0.002∗∗∗
(0.000)
2,170,079
No

0.003∗∗∗
(0.001)
−0.079∗∗∗
(0.001)
−0.002∗∗∗
(0.000)
2,170,079
Yes

Notes: ∗ ∗ ∗/ ∗ ∗/∗ indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
Each column reports coefficients and standard errors from an OLS
regression. Dependent variable is a dummy that equals one if a
person recidivates within 1 year of an initial traffic transgression.
The variable suspension indicates whether a person’s license was
temporarily suspended after the initial traffic transgression.
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Table 1.7: Non-Parametric Regression Results
(1)
(2)
Recidivism (Any)

(3)
(4)
Recidivism (Speeding)

1-Month Suspension

−0.046
(0.029)

−0.046∗∗
(0.019)

−0.023
(0.032)

−0.031
(0.023)

Observations Used
Selection Algorithm
Bandwidth

13,662
CCT
76.44

26,714
IK
152.2

9,995
CCT
55.62

16,190
IK
90.61

Notes: ∗ ∗ ∗/ ∗ ∗/∗ indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by distinct values of the running variable.
Each column reports coefficients and standard errors from a local linear regression
discontinuity (RD) model. A triangular Kernel function was used to construct the
estimator. Coefficients yield the effect of a one month license suspension following
the treatment transgression on the probability of committing another violation
within 1 year. Columns (1) and (2) show the results for recidivism in general,
columns (3) and (4) show the result for speeding-specific recidivism.
Bandwidth was selected using algorithms developed by Calonico et al. (2014)
(CCT) and Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2011) (IK), respectively.
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Figure 1.1: Data Selection from the Central Traffic Registry

Notes: This graph illustrates which observations can be used for the analysis. Data source is the digital
German central traffic registry as of 30 April 2014. The final analysis sample is comprised of offenders with at
least two speeding transgression. One, the so-called “treatment transgression” must have occurred between
1 May 2012 and 1 December 2012 (dashed frame) thus allowing for a sufficient follow-up period. Another
transgression, the so called “original transgression,” must have occurred prior to the treatment transgression
and the penalty for this original transgression must have obtained legal force between 186 and 545 days
before the date of the treatment transgression. Persons whose transgressions over time are illustrated by
circles are part of the final sample. Persons whose transgressions over time are illustrated by triangles do
not become part of the final sample.
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Figure 1.2: Treatment Probability by Time

Notes: Everybody in the analysis sample has committed (at least) two speeding violations. The first of
these violations is referred to as the “original transgression.” The second of these violations is referred to as
the “treatment transgression.” Loosely speaking, if the treatment transgression occurs within 365 days after
the original transgression, a person should have his/her license suspended for 1 month. Data are aggregated
by the count of days that have passed between the date on which the penalty for the original transgression
obtained legal force and the date of the treatment transgression. Each point in this plot represents the raw
probability of having one’s license suspended due to the treatment transgression against the day count. The
vertical red line indicates that 366 days have passed between these two transgressions.
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Figure 1.3: Recidivism Rate by Time
(a) Rate of Recidivism (Any)

(b) Rate of Recidivism (Speeding)

Notes: Everybody in the analysis sample has committed (at least) two speeding violations. The first of these
violations is referred to as the “original transgression.” The second of these violations is referred to as the
“treatment transgression.” Loosely speaking, if the treatment transgression occurs within 365 days after the
original transgression, a person should have his/her license suspended for 1 month. This graph plots rates of
recidivism (i.e. the probability of committing yet another, third offense) within 1 year against the number
of days (in 3-day bins) that have passed between the date on which the penalty for the original transgression
obtained legal force and the date of the treatment transgression. The vertical red line indicates that 366
days have passed between these two dates. The horizontal lowess lines provide a flexible fit.
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Figure 1.4: Distribution of Time until Treatment Transgression

Notes: Everybody in the analysis sample has committed (at least) two speeding violations. The first of
these violations is referred to as the “original transgression.” The second of these violations is referred to as
the “treatment transgression.” Loosely speaking, if the treatment transgression occurs within 365 days after
the original transgression, a person should have his/her license suspended for 1 month. Each column in this
histogram shows the frequency (in 3-day time intervals) between these two transgressions. For instance, the
first bin indicates that there were 335 incidences in which 186-188 days had passed between the date on which
the penalty for the original transgression obtained legal force and the date of the treatment transgression.
The vertical red line indicates that 366 days have passed between these two dates.
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(a) Average Age

(b) Percentage Female
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(c) Number of Prior Offenses

Notes: Everybody in the analysis sample has committed (at least) two speeding violations. The first of
these violations is referred to as the “original transgression.” The second of these violations is referred to as
the “treatment transgression.” Loosely speaking, if the treatment transgression occurs within 365 days after
the original transgression, a person should have his/her license suspended for 1 month. This graph plots
averages of non-outcomes against the number of days (in 3-day bins) that have passed between the date on
which the penalty for the original transgression obtained legal force and the date of treatment transgression.
The vertical red line indicates that 366 days have passed between these two dates. The horizontal lowess
lines provide a flexible fit.
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Figure 1.6: Treatment Effect by Bandwith
(a) Rate of Recidivism (Any)

(b) Rate of Recidivism (Speeding)

Notes: This graph displays point estimates and corresponding confidence intervals from a local linear regression discontinuity (RD) model over a range of bandwidth choices. A triangular Kernel function was used to
construct the estimator. The top figure shows the results for recidivism in general. The bottom figure shows
the results for speeding-specific recidivism.

CHAPTER 1. SPEEDING, PUNISHMENT, AND RECIDIVISM

42

Figure 1.7: Treatment Effect by Recidivism Time Window
(a) Recidivism (Any)

(b) Recidivism (Any)

Notes: These graphs show point estimates and confidence bands of the treatment effect divided by the
average recidivism rate for different recidivism time periods. Results stem from a set of linear regressions
with controls for age, sex, number of prior offenses, and region of residence.

Chapter 2
More Than Hot Air? Low Emission
Zones, Air Pollution, and Infant
Health
2.1

Introduction

So poor was the air quality in the 1960s, that residents of the Ruhr area in Germany could
not hang out their laundry without their clothes turning dark from all the dust and dirt that
were blown into the air by the local heavy industry. Since then, large strides in improving
air quality have been made throughout the developed world: smog and industrial pollution
have been substantially reduced, chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) has been banned, and today’s
Ruhr area residents can worry-free hang their whites out to dry.
Today’s worst pollution no longer stems from chimneys but from motor vehicle exhaust.
Cars are the main source of particulate matter which has become the focal point of air quality regulation with first limits set in 1987 by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in
the US, and somewhat later by EU Clean Air Directives in Europe (Wolff and Perry, 2010,
provide a comprehensive review of EU and US policies). This legislation has been aimed at
reducing mortality and adverse health outcomes associated with fine particulate pollution,
43
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such as heart failure and respiratory diseases (Dominici et al., 2006). It has, however, not
been a resounding success. Despite technological progress, cleaner vehicles, and improved
traffic flow, the reductions in the concentration of fine particulate matter in the air did not
satisfy the expectations and limits set by legislators. This has led many communities to embrace more radical and creative measures to improve air quality and ultimately the health
of their residents.
The goal of this study is to examine the health effects of one of the most aggressive policy
measures that has been enacted in order to curb air pollution stemming from motor vehicles, namely Low Emission Zones (LEZs). LEZs impose an outright ban of vehicles that fail
to meet pollution standards from a city’s streets. An evaluation of this policy measure is
interesting for at least three reasons. First, the introduction of LEZs provides an attractive
natural experiment that overcomes problems of observational studies in establishing a causal
relationship between policies intended to reduce pollution and health outcomes. Using rich
birth data, I focus on infant health since the link between pollution and health outcomes is
immediate for this population group, and because increases in birth weight reflect reductions
in different types of pollution not just fine particulate matter. Second, the staggered introduction of LEZs throughout Germany makes for a clean identification strategy and creates a
natural control group for treatment cities. Finally, there is a fierce debate about the success
or failure of LEZs and whether this policy measure can be a role model for other cities and
countries. An evaluation of the effectiveness of LEZs is, therefore, of high importance for
policy makers.
For decades, establishing a causal relationship between pollution and health has been a
challenge for economists and public health officials alike. After all, exposure to air pollution
is not randomly assigned. For instance, clean air is reflected in higher real estate prices
(Chay and Greenstone, 2005). Expensive neighborhoods, in turn, tend to attract tenants
who have higher incomes, the means to push for better schools, and more resources at the
disposal. Altogether, pollution is strongly correlated with many other inputs to the production of health (Grossman, 1972), making it hard to disentangle its impact from those of other
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determinants. The identification of causal effects is further complicated by the long time
period that is required for pollution to materialize in the form of lower health. Exposure to
pollution in the past might take years to be reflected in adverse health outcomes, and at this
point it is often impossible to backtrack and attribute current health conditions to pollution
exposure in the past.
This study overcomes these challenges by two means. First, I focus on the relationship
between LEZs and infant health, in particular birth outcomes. This focus on newborns has
the advantage that the link between in utero exposure to pollution and adverse health is
immediate (Glinianaia et al., 2004; Wang et al., 1997). Currie and Neidell (2005) make a
very compelling case for this link using a rich data set from California. Currie et al. (2009)
also show that high concentrations in carbon monoxide have adverse effects on infant health
in New Jersey. Ha et al. (2001) use data from Seoul, South Korea, to confirm that in utero
exposure to pollutants is indeed strongly correlated with low birth weight. Birth weight, in
turn, is an important determinant of long-run outcomes such as adult height, intelligence,
earnings and educational attainment (Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2004; Black et al., 2007;
Currie, 2011). In the short run low birth weight is strongly associated with neonatal mortality and low health (Almond et al., 2005; Oreopoulos et al., 2008). Newborns are also a
very vulnerable part of the population and therefore require special protection.
Second, I exploit a policy change that plausibly creates exogenous variation in pollution.
Such natural experiments are rare, although economists have been successful in identifying
and analyzing the few that exist. For instance, a series of papers evaluates the effects of
the closure and subsequent reopening of a Utah steel Mill in 1987/88 (Pope, 1989; Pope
et al., 1992). Chay and Greenstone (2003b) exploit a sharp drop in pollution due to the
1981-1982 recession to establish a link between the concentration of total suspended particulates (TSPs) in the air and infant mortality. In a separate study the same authors try to
identify this relationship focusing on changes in air pollution in the immediate aftermath of
the passage of the Clean Air Act of 1970 (Chay and Greenstone, 2003a). Driving restrictions
(Davis, 2008) and congestion charges (Leape, 2006) in major cities constitute other poten-
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tial natural experiments. Currie and Walker (2011) assess the effect of the introduction
of EZ-Pass, an electronic toll collection system in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, on birth
outcomes. Luechinger (2014) investigates the impact of mandated desulfurization at power
plants, which resulted in lower sulfur dioxide concentrations, on infant mortality.
The introduction of LEZs in Germany provides a compelling setting to estimate the causal
effect of a far-reaching policy measure aimed at improving air quality and infant health.
Germany is a developed country with levels of air pollution that are typical for Europe. It
also collects detailed information on birth outcomes in a central data base, and is one of the
few countries that makes those available for scientific research. Cities in Germany have also
been able to afford the expense and have been quick to adopt the fairly radical measure of
introducing LEZs.
Even though LEZs are widespread, they remain controversial. The lack of objective research is one of the reasons the effectiveness of LEZs remains a contested issue. The General
German Automobile Club has conducted a study on the impact of LEZs on air quality for
three metropolitan areas which found no effect on air quality (Laberer and Niedermeier,
2009). The results, methodology, and somewhat arbitrary selection of those three treatment
cities have been attacked by environmental groups as “flawed” and an “apples to orange
comparison” (Reh, 2009). Several cities have commissioned evaluations of their own LEZs.
These analyses usually follow a simple and potentially inadequate first-difference approach
and depending on the commissioned researcher often lead to conflicting findings (Morfeld
et al., 2011; Cyrys et al., 2014, among others). The most reliable evaluation to date comes
from Wolff (2014), who analyzed the effect of LEZs on pollution levels in 9 (out of today 44)
cities which have introduced an LEZ, using a difference-in-differences approach. His study
finds that pollution levels were indeed reduced by the introduction of LEZs.
What is more, all of the above studies are subject to substantial measurement error as
they focus entirely on measurements of P M10 , the class of particulate matter with a diameter smaller than 10µm. This is reasonable in the sense that P M10 concentrations are
obtained at most air quality monitors, and the EU Commission has regulated the concen-
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tration level of this particular pollutant. However, the focus on P M10 , might miss the point.
For instance, a study of the LEZ in the city of Leipzig found that its LEZ had no effect on
the P M10 concentration in the city. A follow-up investigation by the Leibniz Institute, however, found that the introduction of an LEZ in the city of Leipzig had reduced the amount
of carbon black and ultra-particulate matter (between 0.06 and 700 nanometers) by a third
(Rasch et al., 2013). Carbon black and ultra-particulate matter are clearly more harmful
pollutants than P M10 . They are smaller and, for that reason, can get into the blood stream
easier. Thus, regardless of the validity of a study design, the focus on P M10 in previous
studies might very well underestimate the health benefits of LEZs.
This study, therefore, estimates the reduced form effects of LEZs on both P M10 concentrations and infant health. Since P M10 is not the only pollutant affected by an LEZ introduction, the two outcomes - fine particulate pollution and birth outcomes - are evaluated
separately rather than sequentially in a 2SLS-type of specification. That is, improvements in
infant health are allowed to be driven by reductions in any kind of pollutantion, not merely
P M10 . I address methodological concerns by applying a difference-in-differences model which
exploits the staggered introduction of LEZs throughout Germany. The main identifying assumption is that birth outcomes in cities, which at a given point in time have introduced an
LEZ, follow the same trend as birth outcomes in cities which have not (yet) introduced a zone.

2.2

Background

The focus of both US and EU regulation of air pollution has for the most part been on particulate matter, especially P M10 and P M2.5 . These are fine particles, solid or liquid, which
have a diameter of 10 micrometers (µm) or less, and 2.5 µm or less, respectively. Fine particulates are often tainted with traces of heavy metal or other carcinogenic substances. The
smaller a particle, the easier it can enter the human lung and blood stream. The European
Commission estimates that in the EU, P M10 is causing around 348,000 premature deaths
every year, making it by far Europe’s deadliest air pollutant (Watkiss et al, 2005). It is
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also the main culprit in hundreds of thousands of respiratory or cardiac hospital admissions.
The main source of fine particulate matter are motor vehicles. They account for thirty to
fifty percent of P M10 emissions and are also a major source of carbon monoxide (CO) and
nitrous oxide (N O2 ) emissions (Friedrich, 2006).
Council Directive 1999/30/EC has set numeric limits for the P M10 concentration that is
permissible in EU member cities.1 These limits were enforced in two phases. In phase 1
(January 2005 through December 2009), measurements of pollution levels were not allowed
to exceed a yearly average of 40µg/m3 at any of a city’s monitoring stations. In addition, the
daily average was not allowed to be higher than 50µg/m3 on more than 35 days. In phase
2, starting in January 2010, these limits were supposed to be raised to a yearly average of
20µg/m3 and only 7 exceedance days per year. In particular the latter limit proved to be
very hard to attain. In 2007, 70 percent of EU cities with populations of more than 250,000
violated even the less stringent phase 1 limits (Wolff and Perry, 2010). In response, Council
Directive 2008/50/EC abandoned phase 2 but in return required higher reporting standards
and introduced stiffer penalties for non-compliance or non-action.
Between 2005 and 2007, more than two thirds of Germany’s 82 cities with a population of
more than 100,000 were violating the 35-day limit in at least one year. All 82 were en route
to non-attainment of the much stingier phase 2 limits and would have violated the 7-day
limit. As a result, they were forced to develop so called “clean air action plans”. The center
piece of these plans, in many cases, was the introduction of a low emission zone.
The federal government has broadly supported these action plans and categorized vehicles
into 4 classes based on the European emission standards, Euro 1 through 4. On one end
of the spectrum are “dirty” Euro 1 diesel-powered vehicles without a particle filter. At the
other end of the spectrum are gasoline (or even electric) vehicles with a catalytic converter.
Drivers who intend to enter an LEZ have to obtain a sticker that has to be placed on the
windshield and indicates the pollution level associated with their vehicle. The cleanest vehicles are issued a green sticker, somewhat dirtier vehicles receive a yellow or red sticker and
1

Although P M2.5 , CO, and N O2 were mentioned in the directive no specific limits were announced for
these kinds of emissions.
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the dirtiest vehicles are not issued a sticker at all. LEZs tend to be introduced in different
stages, where in stage 1 only vehicles without stickers are banned from entering a zone, in
stage 2 vehicles with red stickers are also banned, and in stage 3 only vehicles with a green
sticker are allowed.2
The size of LEZs varies from city to city, however it virtually always covers the city center.
Since this is where most of the commercial and cultural activities take place, bypassing an
LEZ is usually not an option for drivers of dirty vehicles. For example, Figure 2.1 shows
Berlin’s LEZ. It covers about a third of Berlin’s 3.5 million inhabitants including most places
of political, cultural, and economic significance. Entering a zone without an adequate sticker
is sanctioned with a 40 Euro fine and 1 point in the central traffic registry. Vehicle owners
can, of course, retrofit their vehicles, for example by building in filters, so that they fall in a
higher class.
My identification strategy is based on the fact that cities have introduced LEZs at different
points in time, and have upgraded to stages 2 and 3 at different times. This allows me to
disentangle the effect of LEZs from seasonal influences and economy wide trends. What is
more, the staggered introduction supplies a natural control group for treatment cities, namely
communities which have yet to implement their LEZs. The cities of Berlin, Cologne, and
Hannover were the first cities to introduce an LEZ in January 2008; Mannheim, Reutlingen,
and Stuttgart followed suit in March 2008; and many more introduced LEZs subsequently.
Figure 2.2 shows all 82 German cities with 100,000 or more inhabitants (as of 2005); cities
which at a given point in time introduced a zone are marked with a triangle. 44 out of 82
cities had introduced an LEZ by the beginning of 2013, others plan to do so in the future.

2.3

Data

My main source of data are German birth records from 2005 to 2012. Access to this data
via remote execution was provided by the Research Data Center of the (German) Statistical
2

There are a few exceptions, for instance for ambulances or military vehicles.
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Offices of the Laender. Ultimately, the data are based on information that has to be provided
by a newborn’s parents in order to obtain a birth certificate. By German law, births need
to be registered with the local civil registry office within 7 days. In order to be issued a
birth certificate, parents need to provide a written medical certificate issued by either the
delivering hospital or (in the rare case of a home birth) by a certified midwife who was
present during the birth of their child. This certificate must contain information about the
child’s name, the day and time of the birth, the child’s birth weight and height, and whether
it was a stillbirth or live birth. Parents also need to fill out an application form containing,
among other things, their place of residence, dates of birth, nationalities, marital status, the
mother’s labor force status, the number of previous births in this marriage, the sex of the
child, whether it was a twin or multiple birth, and (if applicable) the birth order.
All of this information is entered into a federal registry database. Periodically, the Research Data Center of the German Federal Statistical Office uses these data to create an
anonymized and edited data file. Names and exact addresses are erased from the data although the place of residence is not. By law every child born in Germany must have a
birth certificate, which is also required to be issued a passport and/or ID-card, to obtain
health insurance, to request parental allowance, or any kind of government assistance. It
is therefore reasonable to assume that the birth data contain information on all births in
Germany. I focus on three main outcomes: a continuous measure of birth weight in grams,
a dummy variable indicating low birth weight (<2,500g), and a dummy variable indicating
a stillbirth. Since small towns and rural areas are unlikely to introduce an LEZ, I focus on
births that occurred in cities with populations of at least 100,000.
I also obtained monthly data on pollution levels in German cities for 2005 to 2012. Most
communities in my sample have air quality monitors within the city limits that measure
P M10 concentrations in the air. Some of the monitors also measure the levels of sulfur
dioxide (SO2 ). The data were provided by the German Federal Environmental Agency. Of
course, an evaluation of LEZs’ effects on pollution levels is important in itself. In addition,
it can help shed some light on the mechanism through which LEZs affect infant health.
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Selection into treatment is an obvious concern with this natural experiment. For example,
Figure 2.3 shows that cities with high levels of air pollution are more likely adopt LEZs than
cities that rarely ever violate the P M10 limits set by the European commission. In order to
investigate such selection issues, I have categorized the 82 cities in this study into two groups:
“ever adopters” which introduce an LEZ at some point in the 2008 to 2012 time window,
and “never adopters” which have not introduced a zone during this time interval. This categorization is further refined by distinguishing between “early adopters” which introduce an
LEZ before the end of 2009, and “late adopters” which introduce an LEZ between 2010 and
2012. I have also experimented with even finer categorizations, it did not affect the findings.
Panel 2.3a of Figure 2.3 plots the number of exceedance days (per month) for ever adopters
and never adopters. Clearly, ever adopters have had more trouble meeting the pollution
limits. It is, however, important to note that differences in levels do not jeopardize my identification strategy. The validity of a difference-in-differences estimator rests on the commontime-trend assumption, i.e. the assumption that pollution/ birth outcome trends would have
been the same in both treatment and control cities in the absence of treatment. If the pretreatment period from 2005-2007 is any indication, this key assumption appears to be met.
Panel 2.3b plots the monthly P M10 levels for both “ever-adopters” and “never adopters”.
Again, both groups follow strikingly similar time trends. It should be noted that, in cases
in which there are multiple monitors in a city, the P M10 and exceedance day variables are
based on data from the monitor reporting the highest pollution. This is the same rule by
which the European Commission determines whether a city has violated the limits set in
its Clean Air Directives. Further distinguishing between early and late adopters does not
substantially change the results. In the pre-treatment period, pollution levels in both groups
follow a virtually identical time trend for average P M10 (see Panel 2.3d), while the number
of monthly exceedance days may have dropped somewhat quicker in early adopting cities
than in late adopting cities (see Panel 2.3c).
The graphical evaluation of air pollution time trends, yields another important result. The
largest reductions in fine particulate concentration levels appear to have occurred long be-
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fore LEZs had been introduced. In fact, substantial improvements in air quality occurred
over the course of 2005 and 2006 when the law for a classification of vehicles into different
pollution classes had not even been created, and thus before any plans for an LEZ could
have possibly been announced.3 The vertical red line indicates the month in which the first
three cities introduced their LEZs, i.e. January 2008. Pollution levels did not move very
much following this introduction. Of course, Figure 2.3 masks a lot of heterogeneity across
cities, and as mentioned before, the P M10 measure is not necessarily a good measure of air
quality, let alone health effects. Nonetheless, this indication of at best very small pollution
effects will prove to be consistent with other findings of this paper.
One might be equally concerned about differential time trends in birth outcomes (birth
weight, low birth weight, and stillbirth). Figures 2.4a through 2.4f help mitigate such worries. Figure 2.4a suggests that the average birthweight is between five and ten grams lower
in adopting cities. This is a very small difference to begin with. More importantly, the gap
neither widens nor narrows much in the pre-treatment period, indicating that birthweight
follows an identical time trend in adopting and non-adopting cities. This remains true if we
further distinguish between early and late adopters (see Figure 2.4b), and not only holds
for trends in average birthweight but also for trends in the incidence of low birthweight
(<2.500g) as is demonstrated by Figures 2.4c and 2.4d. At first blush, the common time
trend assumption appears to be harder to justify by Figure 2.4e. However, it should be noted
that stillbirths are very rare outcomes in Germany with only about 70 instances per month
for all 82 cities in my sample. For example, the early 2005 difference between the 0.39% share
of stillbirths that is observed in adopting cities and the 0.35% share in non-adopting cities
amounts to a difference of just 8 stillbirths. Therefore, the difference in stillbirth incidence
fluctuates only by between 8 and 1 stillbirths per month across adopting and non-adopting
cities.
The means of all outcomes and control variables are shown in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 which
compare the means across cities for the earliest available pre-treatment year 2005 and the
3

This regulation, which is commonly known as “Plakettenverordnung”, was passed on 10 October 2006.
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latest available post-treatment year, 2012. There are virtually no economically significant
differences across city categories with respect to birth outcomes. For instance, in 2005 the
average birthweight in ever-adopting cities is 3328 while the average birthweight in neveradopting cities is 3334. What is more, both mother and infant characteristics are fairly
balanced across cities. For example, the proportion of teenage mothers is virtually identical
in adopting, non-adopting, and early-adopting and late adopting cities.4 This indicates that
it is unlikely that less resourceful mothers tend to be located in cities which - for whatever
reason - never introduce an LEZ. Again, this supports the identification strategy at hand.
For instance, one might be concerned that other policies, such as spending on public health,
might be correlated with both mother characteristics and the propensity to introduce an
LEZ, so that the measured effect of an LEZ on infant health would be biased. The similarity
in levels and even more importanty in time trends of adopting and non-adopting cities, mitigates such concerns. For example, Tables 2.1 and 2.2 also show that out of wetlock births
have increased over time. This secular trend can be observed nationwide and is equally
pronounced in all types of cities.
A simple “before” and “after” comparison is also revealing in that it can yield a rough estimate of the expected treatment effects. An examination of birth outcomes shows little sign
of an effect of the policy on either birth weight or birth height. The incidence of stillbirths
and light births does not change much over time, neither does the ponderal index which is the
body mass index (BMI) equivalent for newborns. All groups show some reduction in P M10
pollution levels and the number of days on which an average concentration of 50 µg/m3 was
exceeded. However, there is little indication that these reduction are more pronounced in
adopting cities than in non-adopting cities.
Of course, the level of aggregation might mask heterogeneity which is one of the reasons
why city-specific time trends will be included in the regression analysis.5 Nonetheless, these
4

Due to the large sample size, small means differences often show up as statistically significant when
tested explicitly. So, while there are no economically meaningful differences in levels, the pre-treatment
characteristics are not always perfectly balanced from a purely statistical point of view.
5
Of course, if the common time trend assumption is met, the inclusion of city specific time trends should
not affect the results. In a difference-in-differences setting, it is therefore best practice to assess the point
estimates’ robustness to the inclusion of such trend variables. For a thorough discussion of this issue, see
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graphical comparisons and the comparison of pre-treatment means are comforting in that
they suggest that never adopters are indeed a viable control group for ever adopters, and
differences for early adopters can be compared to either differences in late adopters or never
adopters.

2.4

Methods

A difference-in-differences design is applied to assess the effect of the introduction of an
LEZ on birth outcomes. In order to implement this estimator, the following equation is
estimated using OLS:

yijt = α+βActivejt +γM otherCharit +δChildCharit +

81
X
j=1

θj Cityj +

95
X

τt T imet +εijt (2.1)

t=1

where yijt is the birth outcome (birth weight, low birth weight, stillbirth) for child i born
at time t in city j. Activejt is a dummy indicator that takes on a value of 1 if in the
9 months prior to a birth, a low emission zone has been active in the mother’s city of
residence. M otherCharit is a set of control variables pertaining to mother characteristics.
These include the age of the mother (in years), and three dummies that equal one if the
mother is married, in employment, and a German citizen, respectively. ChildCharit includes
3 dummies indicating the sex of the child, whether the child has a twin, and whether the
child has multiple twins. I also include 81 city fixed effects, one for all but one city included
in the data set, as well as year-month time fixed effects for each (but one) of the 96 months
between January 2005 and December 2012. The main coefficient of interest is β which yields
the effect of LEZ adoption on birth outcomes.
This main specification is estimated in a couple of different variations. For instance, I
replace the Activejt -Dummy by a set of dummies for stage 1, 2, and 3 zones.6 In order to
Wolfers (2006).
6
Many cities were about to upgrade to stage 3 on January 2013, but I only have data available until the
end of 2012. Therefore, the sample of stage 3 cities is very small. For that reason, the dummies for stage 2
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account for anticipation and/or belated compliance by drivers as well as gestational time, the
Activejt -Dummy will be replaced with a set of leads and lags in some specifications. I also
assess the robustness of all specifications to the inclusion of city-specific time trends. These
should help to account for a potential correlation of LEZ introduction with trends in city
specific determinants of birth outcomes, such as local improvements in perinatal medicine
(if there are any). The same specification as in equation 2.1 is used to estimate the effects
of an LEZ on pollution outcomes, in which case y(i)jt represents the average monthly P M10
concentration and the number of exceedance days per month. In this case, Activejt is equal
to one if an LEZ was active in the month of the observation.
Inference in a difference-in-differences setting with grouped data is subject to the so called
Moulton problem (Moulton, 1986). Errors of observations stemming from the same city
might conceivably be correlated. Such intra-group correlation will not bias the coefficient of
interest, β, but will lead to inconsistent standard errors. I counter this potential problem by
adjusting all standard errors for clustering at the city level (Liang and Zeger, 1986). Bertrand
et al. (2004) also note that serial correlation in the error terms constitute another potential
threat to the validity of standard errors in a difference-in-differences setting. At the same
time, Hansen (2007) points out that with a sufficient number of groups, serial correlation
ceases to pose a problem. With 82 clusters, I am well above Angrist and Pischke’s (2008)
rule of thumb of at least 42 clusters to achieve reliable inference.
The validity of the difference-in-differences estimator rests on the assumption that trends
in mother characteristics are identical across treatment and control group. Figures 2.3 and
2.4 and Tables 2.1 and 2.2 have provided some evidence that this is indeed the case. But my
empirical setup might still yield biased coefficients if mothers with specific characteristics are
enticed by the introduction of a zone to move into adopting cities. A more formal test of such
sorting behavior can be conducted by regressing mother characteristics on LEZ adoption in
the following form:
and 3 were aggregated into a single dummy for most specifications.
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(2.2)

t=1

where M otherCharijt are mother or parent characteristics, namely the mother’s age, a
dummy indicating that the mother is younger than 18 years, a dummy indicating whether
the mother was in employment prior to giving birth, an indicator for whether the mother
is a German citizen, an indicator for whether either parent is a German citizen, a dummy
for whether the mother is married, and a dummy for a “shotgun marriage”, i.e. mother got
married less than 9 months prior to giving birth. The results for this OLS regression are
displayed in Table 2.3. Despite the large sample size, no significant effect can be found for
any of these characteristics. This suggests that any effect of the LEZs on birth outcomes is
not driven by a changing composition of mothers. In other words, there is no indication that
any particular group of mothers sorts into or out of cities that have introduced an LEZ.

2.5

Results

Table 2.4 provides the results of the main regression for three different birth outcomes:
birth weight, a dummy indicating low birth weight (< 2,500g) and a dummy indicating a
stillbirth. In column (1), I only control for city and time fixed effects, in column (2) I add
controls for maternal and child characteristics. If my difference-in-differences setup is valid,
this should not notably alter the point estimates, and indeed this is the case. Nor does
the addition of city-specific trends lead to substantial changes in the point estimates, which
again speaks to the validity of the diff-in-diff approach. Column (2) suggests that the intoduction of an LEZ is associated with an increase in birthweight of a little more than 2 grams.
This corresponds to an increase of less than 0.1 percent. Despite relatively small standard
errors, none of the coefficients is different from zero at the 5 % significance level, indicating
that the policy measure has no effect on birthweight. What is more, the high precision of
the estimates rules out large undetected effects. Similar results emerge for the incidence of
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low-weight births and stillbirths, respectively. Neither appears to be affected by the policy.
Despite the evidence presented in the previous section, one might still be concerned about
including observations from cities that never introduce a zone (“never-adopters”) in the control group. For instance, underlying trends in determinants of birthweight - both observable
and unobservable - might differ across ever-adopters and never-adopters. For this reason,
Table 2.5 repeats the analysis only using births that occur in cities which eventually adopt an
LEZ (“ever-adopters”). As shown in Section 3, there is little indication that never-adopters
consitute an inappropriate control group. Nonetheless, it is reassuring that limiting the
sample to ever-adopters does not change the results. Column (2) indicates that an LEZ
raises the average birth weight in a city by about 4 gramms, although the null hypothesis of
no effect cannot be rejected at any reasonable level of significance. There is also still little
evidence for any association between the prevalence of low-weight births and the existence
of an LEZ. I do find a statistically significant negative relationship between the prevalence
of stillbirths and the introduction of an LEZ. Given a prevalence of stillbirths of about 0.4
percent of births, the point estimates suggest that the introduction of an LEZ leads to a
substantial decrease in stillbirths of about 10 percent. However, in absolute terms this is a
very small reduction.
Nor does the stage of a zone have much of an effect on birth outcomes. One might expect
that the higher “treatment intensity” of stage 2 or stage 3 zones, which ban vehicles with no
stickers, red strickers, and yellow stickers, improves infant health more than the restrictions
of stage 1 zones, which only ban vehicles with no sticker. Yet there is little evidence that
this is indeed the case. Column (2) of Table 2.6 shows no meaningful relationship between
the introduction of a stage 2 or 3 zone and average birthweight. The economic significance
of both coefficient estimates is negligible, and both are fairly precisely estimated zeros.
The results are also not sensitive to the choice of control cities (see Table 2.7 which repeats
the analysis focusing on ever-adopters only). Although column (1) shows a positive (albeit
not statistically significant) effect of stage 2 or 3 zones on birthweight, the magnitude of
the effects indicates that these improvements are unlikely to have an effect on either infant
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health, mortality, or outcomes later in life. By way of comparison, a recent study based on
birth registry data for Swedish siblings finds that light smoking during pregnancy is associated with a decrease in birthweight by 162g (Juarez and Merlo, 2013). My findings are,
therefore, best interpreted as very precisely estimated zero effects. This remains true regardless of whether maternal or child characteristics are controlled for or whether city-specific
time trends are included. Columns (3) through (6) show the association between different
types of LEZs and the incidence of low-weight births and stillbirths.
Overall, the point estimates indicate that the introduction of an LEZ is not associated with
any significant improvements in infant health. The small standard errors indicate that large
effects can be ruled out. However, in the absence of a true “first stage” it is difficult to judge
whether health improvements did not materialize because the policy measure had no effect
on air quality to begin with, or because pollution reductions did not translate into health
improvements. Nonetheless, conformity with results for pollution would lend the estimates
of the health effects more credibility. Therefore, I now turn to the discussion of the pollution
results, i.e. the implementation of regression equation 2.1 with P M10 levels and the number
of exceedance days as outcomes.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.8 indicate that LEZs reduce the number of days per month
on which pollution limits are exceeded by 0.430 or about 5 days per year. This effect is borderline statistically significant and robust to the inclusion of city-specific trends. A focus on
“ever-adopters” by excluding “never-adopting” cities from the sample, does not alter these
results (see columns (5) and (6)). There is some evidence that LEZs slightly reduce average
monthly P M10 levels (see columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) of Table 2.8). All coefficients have a
negative sign and are similar in size, but only one of them is statistically significant at the 10
percent level. However, the type of LEZ appears to be an important determinant of pollution
reductions. As is evident from Table 2.9, a stage 2 or 3 zone reduces average monthly P M10
levels by 1.5 µg/m3 which corresponds to roughly a 5 percent reduction. More restrictive
zones are also more effective in reducing the number of exceedance days, as is evident from
columns (1), (2), (5), and (6).
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Discussion and Robustness

Overall, the results for monthly average P M10 levels and exceedance days are consistent
with both the descriptive statistics of section 3 and the findings for infant health. LEZs appear to have relatively small effects on pollution levels, with more restrictive LEZs achieving
slightly larger reductions. This suggests that LEZs lead to pollution reductions that are just
not substantial enough to improve the health outcomes of newborns.
One might still be concerned whether the moderate reduction in pollution can actually be
attributed to the policy at hand or are just random noise. To mitigate such concerns, I run
the same pollution regression with SO2 pollution as an outcome. Motor vehicles are not a
major source of SO2 pollution, so LEZs should have little effect on SO2 levels. The results
of Table 2.10 confirm this. There is no meaningful relationship between SO2 levels and LEZ
adoption. Another obvious concern with my identification strategy relates to timing. For
instance, it is conceivable that drivers anticipated the widely announced introduction of an
LEZ in their city. As a result, they may have retrofitted their cars months before the policy
went into place. In the same vein, some drivers may have responded with a delay. There is
some anecdotal evidence that officials in some cities did not impose fines on LEZ violations
in the first month of introduction in order to provide drivers with a transition period. I test
both hypotheses by applying a model of 6 months leads and lags (similar to Autor (2003))
of the following form:

yijt = α +

t=4
X
t=−4

βt Activejt + γM otherCharit + δChildCharit +

81
X
j=1

θj Cityj +

95
X

τt T imet + εijt

t=1

(2.3)
In other words, I run the main regression using 6-months leads and lags of either the Activejt
variable or the Zone Stage indicators, instead of just 1 indicator that switches on and re-
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mains on for a given treatment city. Figure 2.5 plots the coefficients that correspond to the
regression of equation 2.3, along with 95% confidence intervals. There is little evidence for
anticipatory effects. In fact, pollution levels in the 6 months leading up to a policy change do
not differ from those in the 6 months following the policy change. Most pollution reductions
then appear to materialize within 1-2 years of the policy change after which they level off.
Similarly, there is little evidence for long-run effects on birth outcomes. Average birth
weight seems to increase slightly after the introduction of an LEZ. However, these effects are
so small that they cannot be distinguished from zero. Although, compared to the results
for equation 2.1, the standard errors are somewhat inflated, these estimates are still precise
enough to rule out large effects. Moreover, it is comforting that all of the dummies refering to
t − 1 are very close to zero and are insignificant in all specifications. This is another piece of
evidence for the validity of my identification strategy and indicates that anticipatory effects
do not play much of a role.
Finally a limitation of my data is that while I can identify a mother’s county of residence, I
cannot observe whether she lives strictly within an LEZ.7 Since LEZs virtually always cover
the city center where most of the economic and cultural life takes place, one would hope that
the zone has positive spill-overs on mothers who live in the same city but outside of an LEZ.
For example, drivers who used to commute into a city center in their dirty cars may have
been prompted by an LEZ to either buy a cleaner car or to use public transportation instead.
Vehicle registration numbers presented by Wolff (2014) support such a narrative. On the
other hand, drivers might explicitly drive around zones, thus leading to negative spill-overs
on mothers living just ouside of an LEZ. Such a scenario might also lead to heterogeneous
treatment effects where the average effect masks gains in birth weight for children who were
born to mothers within an LEZ and decreases in birth weight for children who were born to
mothers who live outside of an LEZ.
Fortunately, the descriptive statistics of Table 2.11 suggest that this is not the case; instead they favor a scenario of positive spill-over effects. The table shows the average monthly
7

With the exception of Berlin, Hamburg, and Bremen, all cities in my sample consist of just 1 county or
rather are their own county (“Kreisfreie Stadt”)
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pollution levels and exceedance days for Berlin, both before and after the introduction of
the local LEZ. Berlin has 13 air quality monitors, 7 of which are located within the LEZ,
3 are located in the inner city but not within the LEZ, and the remaining 3 are located in
suburban areas further away from the city center. Averages are calculated by giving equal
weight to each monitor. One can observe pollution reductions both at monitors within the
zone and at monitors in suburban areas. In fact, the reduction are strikingly similar in absolute size, although in relative terms the largest reductions are realized within the zone. Of
course, this is only descriptive evidence and only for one city. Nonetheless, it helps mitigate
concerns about highly heterogeneous treatment effects and negative spillover effects.

2.7

Conclusion

This paper evaluates the effects of Low Emission Zones (LEZs) on air quality and infant
health. The staggered introduction of this policy measure - at different points in time in
different cities throughout Germany - provides a series of credible natural experiments, which
my results are based on. These results are robust to changes in the specification and the
choice of control group.
LEZs are one of the most aggressive policy measures enacted to reduce air pollution and to
promote public health. Their introduction is also associated with substantial costs, related
to enforcement, expenditure on retrofitting vehicles, earlier than planned replacements of
new vehicles, and time lost in complying with new rules. Wolff (2014) estimates that the
upgrading of the German vehicle fleet in response to LEZ introductions by itself cost more
than 1 billion dollars between 2008 and 2010, although he points out that these upgrades
also entail benefits for the owners of these vehicles. What is more, the pro-business Institute
for Retail Research estimates that the introduction of an LEZ is associated with a 7 percent
decrease in the number of customers to stores located within a city center (Lindstaedt, 2009).
Of course, these revenue losses might be offset by revenue gains in other parts of a city.
As for the benefits of the policy measure, my results indicate that LEZs have only had
relatively small effects on air pollution as measured by P M10 concentrations and the number
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of days on which a concentration of 50 µg/m3 in P M10 is exceeded. These changes appear
to be too small to translate into substantial improvements in infant health outcomes, such
as birth weight or the incidence of stillbirths. The lack of health effects also indicates that
LEZs do not lead to large reductions in other, hard to measure pollutants, such as ultraparticulate matter and carbon black. Of course, my study is not concerned with measures
of health benefits stemming from lower hospital utilization for respiratory diseases such as
asthma attacks. These are different dimensions of health effects. However, in the face of the
small effect size found in this paper, one may speculate that these benefits are unlikely to
be substantial.
Given the historically low levels of air pollution in Europe, it may not be too surprising
that new measures of pollution reduction, such as LEZs, offer small returns. Nonetheless,
this study indicates policy makers should shift their focus to other policy measures that
have been shown to be more effective and cost-efficient than LEZs. For instance, Currie and
Walker (2011) and Leape (2006) find evidence for the effectiveness of electronic toll systems
and congestion charges. While no silver bullet, these measures have not only improved traffic
flow and thus resulted in pollution reductions and health benefits, but have also led to time
savings and increased reliance on public transportation. While more studies are in order to
evaluate costs and benefits of LEZs, this paper indicates that - even though they are more
than hot air - LEZs may well be falling short of policy makers’ and public expectations.
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Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Table of Means: Ever- vs. Never-Adopters
Year 2005
NeverEverAdopters Adopters
Birth Outcomes
Birthweight (in g)
Birthweight <2500g
Birthheight (in cm)
Stillbirth
Ponderal Index
Pollution Outcomes
Monthly P M10 level (µg/m3 )
Monthly Exceedance Days
Monthly SO2 level (µg/m3 )
Mother Characteristics
Mother Married
Mother Working
Mother’s Age
Father’s Age
Under-age Mother
German Mother
Child Characteristics
Female
Twin
Multi-Birth
N*

Year 2012
NeverEverAdopters Adopters

3334
0.072
51.04
0.0035
2.49

3328
0.071
51.12
0.0039
2.48

3330
0.072
50.92
0.0035
2.51

3320
0.072
50.98
0.0039
2.49

29.18
2.56
4.90

32.51
3.82
5.72

23.02
1.215
2.966

27.341
2.325
3.229

0.668
0.423
29.47
33.27
0.01
0.770

0.682
0.394
29.74
33.68
0.01
0.720

0.613
0.406
30.27
33.91
0.006
0.789

0.630
0.401
30.552
34.378
0.006
0.724

0.488
0.030
0.001
73,387

0.485
0.030
0.001
151,566

0.485
0.0322
0.001
78,036

0.486
0.035
0.001
164,276

* N = Number of observations with valid birth weight
Data Source: Research Data Centers of the German Federal Statistical Office and the
Statistical Offices of the Laender for birth statistics, and German Federal Environmental
Agency for pollution measurements.
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Table 2.2: Table of Means: Early- vs. Late-Adopters
Year 2005
EarlyLateAdopters Adopters
Birth Outcomes
Birthweight (in g)
Birthweight <2500g
Birthheight (in cm)
Stillbirth
Ponderal Index
Pollution Outcomes
Monthly P M10 level (µg/m3 )
Monthly Exceedance Days
Monthly SO2 level (µg/m3 )
Mother Characteristics
Mother Married
Mother Working
Mother’s Age
Father’s Age
Under-age Mother
German Mother
Child Characteristics
Female
Twin
Multi-Birth
N*

Year 2012
EarlyLateAdopters Adopters

3325
0.071
51.16
0.0039
2.47

3336
0.071
51.00
0.0038
2.51

3317
0.072
51.02
0.004
2.48

3328
0.072
50.86
0.0036
2.52

34.01
4.48
6.48

30.15
2.77
4.44

28.06
2.521
4.025

26.20
2.011
1.866

0.693
0.367
29.83
33.74
0.009
0.700

0.645
0.485
29.44
33.46
0.012
0.789

0.642
0.374
30.67
34.48
0.006
0.704

0.587
0.496
30.14
34.02
0.008
0.794

0.486
0.030
0.001
117,471

0.481
0.031
0.001
34,095

0.486
0.036
0.001
127,898

0.488
0.033
0.001
36,378

* N = Number of observations with valid birth weight
Data Source: Research Data Centers of the German Federal Statistical Office and the
Statistical Offices of the Laender for birth statistics, and German Federal Environmental
Agency for pollution measurements.

(1)
Mother’s Age
0.019
(0.026)
1,867,733
0.027

(2)
Teen Birth
0.000
(0.000)
1,867,733
0.001

(3)
Mother Working
0.004
(0.043)
1,865,948
0.073

(4)
Mother German
-0.003
(0.002)
1,867,733
0.037

(6)
Parents German
0.000
(0.004)
1,867,733
0.034

(5)
Married
0.002
(0.002)
1,867,733
0.063

(7)
Shotgun Marriage
-0.001
(0.001)
1,210,269
0.002

Data Source: Research Data Centers of the German Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Laender (2005-2012).

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗/ ∗ ∗/∗ indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
Each coefficients stems from a regression of a mother or child characteristic on an LEZ dummy, a set of city dummies and a set of year-month dummies.
Mother’s Age is a continuous variable, Teen Birth is a dummy indicating a birth to a mother younger than 18 years, Mother Working is a dummy indicating
that the mother is in employment, Mother German is a dummy indicating that the mother is a German citizen, Parents German is a dummy indicating
that either the father or the mother is a German citizen, Married is a dummy indicator for a married mother, Shotgun Marriage is an indicator for a mother
who got married less than 9 months prior to the birth (conditional on the mother being married).

Observations
R-squared

VARIABLES
Active Zone

Table 2.3: Design Validity - Regression of Maternal and Child Characteristics on Zone-Dummy
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Table 2.4: Regression of Birth Outcomes on Zone Adoption (All Cities)
VARIABLES
Active Zone

Observations
R-squared
City Fixed Effects
Time Fixed Effects
Controls
City-Specific Trends
Ever-Adopters Only

(1)
Birthweight
-1.4359
(2.1215)

(2)
Birthweight
2.3412
(2.3831)

(3)
Low Weight
0.0010
(0.0008)

(4)
Low Weight
-0.0001
(0.0009)

(5)
Stillbirth
-0.0000
(0.0002)

(6)
Stillbirth
-0.0003
(0.0002)

1,854,106
0.0025
Yes
Yes
No
No
No

1,852,420
0.1290
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

1,854,106
0.0008
Yes
Yes
No
No
No

1,852,420
0.1481
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

1,867,733
0.0001
Yes
Yes
No
No
No

1,865,948
0.0007
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors account for clustering at the city level (82 clusters).
∗ ∗ ∗/ ∗ ∗/∗ indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
Regression results correspond to equation 2.1. Active-dummy is equal to one if a zone has been active for at least 9
months prior to a birth. Controls include mother’s age, labor market status, nationality, and marital status. Controls
for the child’s sex, and indicators for twin or multiple births are also included.
Data Source: Research Data Centers of the German Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Laender
(2005-2012).

Table 2.5: Regression of Birth Outcomes on Zone Adoption (Ever Adopters Only)
VARIABLES
Active Zone

Observations
R-squared
City Fixed Effects
Time Fixed Effects
Controls
City-Specific Trends
Ever-Adopters Only

(1)
Birthweight
0.7593
(2.5660)

(2)
Birthweight
3.7770
(2.7214)

(3)
Low Weight
0.0006
(0.0010)

(4)
Low Weight
-0.0008
(0.0009)

(5)
Stillbirth
-0.0004*
(0.0002)

(6)
Stillbirth
-0.0006***
(0.0002)

1,253,187
0.0022
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes

1,251,782
0.1308
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

1,253,187
0.0009
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes

1,251,782
0.1513
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

1,262,815
0.0001
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes

1,261,329
0.0007
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors account for clustering at the city level (44 clusters).
∗ ∗ ∗/ ∗ ∗/∗ indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
Regression results correspond to equation 2.1. Active-dummy is equal to one if a zone has been active for at least 9
months prior to a birth.Controls include mother’s age, labor market status, nationality, and marital status. Controls for
the child’s sex, and indicators for twin or multiple births are also included.
Data Source: Research Data Centers of the German Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Laender
(2005-2012).
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Table 2.6: Regression of Birth Outcomes on Zone Adoption (All Cities)
VARIABLES
Stage 1 Zone
Stage 2 or 3 Zone

Observations
R-squared
City Fixed Effects
Time Fixed Effects
Controls
City-Specific Trends
Ever-Adopters Only

(1)
Birthweight
-0.7943
(2.1095)
-0.0143
(2.2963)

(2)
Birthweight
0.8853
(1.8660)
-0.0325
(2.4368)

(3)
Low Weight
0.0007
(0.0010)
-0.0005
(0.0007)

(4)
Low Weight
-0.0001
(0.0007)
-0.0011
(0.0009)

(5)
Stillbirth
-0.0004**
(0.0002)
0.0001
(0.0002)

(6)
Stillbirth
-0.0005***
(0.0002)
-0.0001
(0.0002)

1,854,105
0.0025
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No

1,852,419
0.1290
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

1,854,105
0.0008
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No

1,852,419
0.1481
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

1,867,732
0.0001
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No

1,865,947
0.0007
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors account for clustering at the city level (82 clusters).
∗ ∗ ∗/ ∗ ∗/∗ indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
Regression results correspond to equation 2.1. Dummy for Stage 1 is equal to one if a zone prohibiting vehicles with no
sticker has been active for at least 9 months prior to a birth. Dummy for Stage 2 or 3 is equal to one if a zone prohibiting
vehicles with no or just a red sticker has been active for at least 9 months prior to a birth. Controls include mother’s
age, labor market status, nationality, and marital status. Controls for the child’s sex, and indicators for twin or multiple
births are also included.
Data Source: Research Data Centers of the German Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Laender
(2005-2012).
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Table 2.7: Regression of Birth Outcomes on Zone Adoption (Ever Adopters Only)
VARIABLES
Stage 1 Zone
Stage 2 or 3 Zone

Observations
R-squared
City Fixed Effects
Time Fixed Effects
Controls
City-Specific Trends
Ever-Adopters Only

(1)
Birthweight
0.7018
(2.2568)
2.0881
(2.5005)

(2)
Birthweight
1.7674
(1.9364)
1.0035
(2.9030)

(3)
Low Weight
0.0001
(0.0010)
-0.0012
(0.0008)

(4)
Low Weight
-0.0004
(0.0008)
-0.0014
(0.0010)

(5)
Stillbirth
-0.0005***
(0.0002)
-0.0000
(0.0002)

(6)
Stillbirth
-0.0006***
(0.0001)
-0.0001
(0.0002)

1,253,187
0.0022
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

1,251,782
0.1308
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

1,253,187
0.0009
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

1,251,782
0.1513
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

1,262,815
0.0001
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

1,261,329
0.0007
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors account for clustering at the city level (44 clusters).
∗ ∗ ∗/ ∗ ∗/∗ indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
Regression results correspond to equation 2.1. Dummy for Stage 1 is equal to one if a zone prohibiting vehicles with no
sticker has been active for at least 9 months prior to a birth. Dummy for Stage 2 or 3 is equal to one if a zone prohibiting
vehicles with no or just a red sticker has been active for at least 9 months prior to a birth. Controls include mother’s age,
labor market status, nationality, and marital status. Controls for the child’s sex, and indicators for twin or multiple births
are also included.
Data Source: Research Data Centers of the German Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Laender
(2005-2012).

6,648
0.658
Yes
Yes
No
No

(1)
Exceedance
Days
-0.430*
(0.246)
6,648
0.683
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

(2)
Exceedance
Days
-0.409
(0.247)
6,594
0.807
Yes
Yes
No
No

-0.180
(0.385)

(3)
P M10

6,594
0.823
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

-0.703*
(0.360)

(4)
P M10

3,576
0.660
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

(5)
Exceedance
Days
-0.587**
(0.280)
3,576
0.688
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

(6)
Exceedance
Days
-0.485*
(0.256)
3,560
0.748
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

-1.075
(0.721)

(7)
P M10

3,560
0.781
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

-0.590
(0.502)

(8)
P M10

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors account for clustering at the city level (82 clusters).
∗ ∗ ∗/ ∗ ∗/∗ indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
Regression results correspond to equation 2.1. Dummy for Active Zone is equal to one if at the time of measurement, an LEZs has been
active. Dependent variables are monthly P M10 levels and the number of days per month on which a P M10 concentration of 50µg/m3
was exceeded.
Data Source: German Federal Environmental Agency, pollution measurements (2005-2012).

Observations
R-squared
City Fixed Effects
Time Fixed Effects
City-Specific Trends
Ever-Adopters Only

Active Zone

VARIABLES

Table 2.8: Effect of LEZs on Air Pollution: Diff-in-Diff Estimates
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6,648
0.659
Yes
Yes
No
No

(1)
Exceedance
Days
-0.230
(0.234)
-0.795**
(0.322)
6,648
0.683
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

(2)
Exceedance
Days
-0.389
(0.242)
-0.542
(0.340)
6,594
0.760
Yes
Yes
No
No

-0.018
(0.612)
-1.530**
(0.719)

(3)
P M10

6,594
0.786
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

-0.472
(0.489)
-1.531**
(0.766)

(4)
P M10

3,576
0.662
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

(5)
Exceedance
Days
-0.433
(0.268)
-1.150***
(0.422)
3,576
0.688
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

(6)
Exceedance
Days
-0.457*
(0.251)
-0.658*
(0.351)
3,560
0.749
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

-0.710
(0.719)
-2.415**
(0.981)

(7)
P M10

3,560
0.781
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

-0.485
(0.497)
-1.254
(0.755)

(8)
P M10

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors account for clustering at the city level.
∗ ∗ ∗/ ∗ ∗/∗ indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
Regression results correspond to equation 2.1. Dummy for Stage 1 is equal to one if a zone prohibiting vehicles with no sticker was active at
the time of measurement. Dummy for Stage 2 or 3 is equal to one if a zone prohibiting vehicles with no or just a red sticker was active at
the time of measurement. Dependent variables are monthly P M10 levels and the number of days per month on which a P M10 concentration
of 50µg/m3 was exceeded.
Data Source: German Federal Environmental Agency, pollution measurements (2005-2012).

Observations
R-squared
City Fixed Effects
Time Fixed Effects
City-Specific Trends
Ever-Adopters Only

Stage 2 or 3 Zone

Stage 1 Zone

VARIABLES

Table 2.9: Effect of most restrictive LEZs on Air Pollution: Diff-in-Diff Estimates
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Table 2.10: Regression - SO2 (Non-Vehicle) Pollution
VARIABLES
Active Zone

Observations
R-squared
City Fixed Effects
Time Fixed Effects
City-Specific Trends
Ever-Adopters Only

(1)
SO2
-0.442
(0.313)

(2)
SO2
-0.163
(0.301)

(3)
SO2
-0.182
(0.296)

(4)
SO2
-0.111
(0.319)

5,088
0.705
Yes
Yes
No
No

5,088
0.744
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

2,749
0.730
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

2,749
0.767
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors account
for clustering at the city level.
∗ ∗ ∗/ ∗ ∗/∗ indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
Regression results correspond to equation 2.1. Dummy for Active
Zone is equal to one if at the time of measurement, an LEZs has
been active. Dependent variable is monthly SO2 level, a pollutant
for which motor vehicles are not a major source.
Data Source: German Federal Environmental Agency, pollution measurements (2005-2012).

Table 2.11: Average Air Pollution in Berlin 2005-2012
Monthly P M10 Level (Pre)
Monthly P M10 Level(Post)
Exceedance Days (Pre)
Exceedance Days (Post)
Number of Stations

Within Zone(a) Inner City(b) Suburban(c)
31.42
27.66
23.09
28.02
26.75
21.10
3.25
2.27
1.27
2.26
2.25
1.10
7
3
3

Berlin introduced its LEZ on 1 January 2008.
Measurement stations located within the Berlin LEZ.
(b) Measurement stations located within urban Berlin but outside of the LEZ.
(c) Measurement stations located in suburban areas pertaining to Berlin.
Data Source: German Federal Environmental Agency, pollution measurements
(2005-2012).
(a)
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Figure 2.1: Low Emission Zone in Berlin

Source: City of Berlin Website:
http://www.stadtentwicklung.berlin.de/umwelt/luftqualitaet/umweltzone/de/gebiet.shtml
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Figure 2.2: Cities with LEZs Over Time

(a) All Cities

(c) Cities with LEZs - 2009

(b) Cities with LEZs - 2008

(d) Cities with LEZs - 2013

Notes: Maps show all 82 German cities with a population of at least 100,000. Triangles indicate that at the
time a low emission zone was in place.
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Figure 2.3: Pollution Over Time

(a) Monthly Exceedance Days

(b) Monthly P M10 Levels

(c) Monthly Exceedance Days

(d) Monthly P M10 Levels

Notes: Smoothed plots using a LOWESS (locally weighted scatterplot smoothing) regression. A tricube
weighting function, as developed by Cleveland (1979), was applied with a bandwith of 1. Time=1 refers
to January 2005, time=2 refers to February 2005,... time=96 refers to December 2012. The vertical line
indicates the first month in which a city introduced an LEZ, January 2008.
Data Source: German Federal Environmental Agency, pollution measurements (2005-2012)
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Figure 2.4: Birth Outcomes Over Time
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Notes: Smoothed plots using a LOWESS (locally weighted scatterplot smoothing) regression. A tricube weighting function, as
developed by Cleveland (1979), was applied with a bandwith of 1. Time=1 refers to January 2005, time=2 refers to February
2005,... time=96 refers to December 2012. The vertical line indicates the first month in which a city introduced an LEZ,
January 2008.
Data Source: Research Data Centers of the German Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Laender (20052012).
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Figure 2.5: Leads and Lags Model

(a) Effect of Stage 2 or 3 Zone on Ex- (b) Effect of Stage 2 or 3 Zone on P M10
ceedance Days
Levels

(c) Effect of Stage 2 or 3 Zone on Birth
Weight

(d) Effect of Stage 2 or 3 Zone on Prevalence of Low Birth Weight

(e) Effect of Stage 2 or 3 Zone on Prevalence of Stillbirths
Notes: Graph displays coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for 6-months leads and lags of the Stage 2/3 - Dummy, as
specified in equation (3). Outcomes are days per month on which P M10 concentration exceeds 50µg/m3 , monthly levels of
P M10 measured in µg/m3 , birthweight in grams, the incidence of light births (<2,500g), and the incidence of stillbirths.
Data Source: Research Data Centers of the German Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Laender for
birth statistics (2005-2012), and German Federal Environmental Agency for pollution measurements (2005-2012).

Chapter 3
The Effect of Post-and-Hold Laws on
Alcohol Consumption
3.1

Introduction

Alcohol is the third-leading cause of preventable mortality in the United States (Mokdad
et al., 2004). This mortality includes deaths from liver cirrhosis and alcohol related fatal
motor vehicle accidents. Heavy drinking is also a major risk factor for heart disease and
various forms of cancer (Grønbæk et al., 2000). Alcohol has also been found to play a significant role in non-fatal accidents, violent crime, poor birth outcomes, marital instability,
and unemployment (Wagenaar et al., 2010). Because much of these costs are borne by the
state or by individuals who do not abuse alcohol, alcohol control is a justifiable goal of public
policy.
Alcohol control policies include restrictions on the sale of alcohol, alcohol excise taxes and
drunk driving laws. In the set of restrictions on the sale of alcohol, one group that has been
understudied are laws governing the economic behavior of alcohol wholesalers. The modern
history of laws affecting alcohol wholesalers begins with the enactment of the Twenty-First
Amendment. At that time, many states adopted a system to regulate alcohol sales known as
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the License system.1 Each License state has an elaborate bureaucracy that enforces alcohol
laws and violators can lose their license to operate. Under the License system, firms can
be producers, distributors or retailers but vertical integration is prohibited.2 Many of the
states that chose the License system also enacted a set of laws that govern the economic
relationship between wholesalers and retailers of alcohol. Morgan (1988) cites the 1934 report by Fosdick and Scott that provided the plan for the states to regulate the distribution
of alcohol as prohibition was ended. The goals of the plan were to maximize tax revenues
while promoting temperance.
The four key wholesaler laws are minimum mark-up laws, volume discount laws, limits on
credit to retailers, and post-and-hold laws. In theory, these wholesale laws have the effect
of protecting smaller retailers. This has an ambiguous effect on public health because it
may increase average prices but it may also increase the number of retail outlets. Each of
these laws is beverage specific. That is, the specific wholesale laws for beer, for wine and for
spirits can all be different. Minimum mark-up requires that wholesalers establish a minimum
markup for each product sold based on the producer’s price. Volume discounting laws require
wholesalers to charge the same price for products regardless of the amount purchased by retailers. Credit restriction laws limit the wholesalers’ options to provide credit to retailers
and thus raise the cost of doing business to retailers. Post-and-hold laws require wholesalers
to provide a list of prices to the state that can be reviewed by retailers, competitors and
the public. The hold component requires that these prices be held for a set amount of time
(usually 30 days) which allows all retailers the opportunity to make purchases at the same
price. The post-and-hold laws are typically tied to minimum pricing and volume discounting laws. Under post-and-hold laws, quantity discounts are prohibited and wholesalers are
required to provide the same price schedule to all retailers. Some states also have a formula
that maps posted wholesale prices into minimum retail prices, which prevents retailers from
pricing below cost. Post-and-hold laws reduce price competition among both retailers and
1

A smaller number of states chose state-run monopolies for the wholesale and/or retail sale of spirits
and/or wine. All states except Utah and Alabama are License for wholesale beer.
2
Recent changes in Washington State allow retailers to act as distributors.
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wholesalers because the posted prices are locked in for a set amount of time.
One reason that the effects of the state wholesaler laws are an important research subject
is that several large alcohol retailers have argued that the state wholesaler laws are in conflict
with the Sherman Act, which limits anti-competitive behavior. This is also a state-federal
conflict since the authority to regulate alcohol is a state prerogative while the Sherman act
is a federal law. A series of court challenges brought by retailers against state governments
have addressed this conflict without any overall resolution to date. In Granholm v. Heald,
544 U.S. 460, 472 the Supreme Court struck down laws in New York and Michigan that allowed for within state direct shipments from wineries to consumers, but banned out-of-state
shipments. This ruling established that state alcohol regulations could be in violation of
federal antitrust laws. In Costco Wholesale Corporation v. Hoen, 522 F.3d 874, 9th. Cir.
the state of Washington’s liquor laws were subjected to scrutiny under the Sherman Act.
Costco failed to win a court victory but subsequently succeeded in changing the laws through
a voter initiative. In Maryland, a large retailer successfully sued the state to end post-andhold pricing system and the prohibition of volume discounts (TFWS Inc. v. Schaefer 325
F.3d 234, 4th Cir., 2003). Also, Governor Malloy of Connecticut has argued for repeal of
Connecticut’s post-and-hold law because he believes it creates excessive restrictions on competition and pricing (Pazniokas, 2015). In Michigan, the Mackinac Center for Public Policy,
has lobbied the Michigan Alcohol Control Commission to rescind the state’s post-and-hold
law as anti-competitive.
The courts have noted that there is very little research to date on the effect of the wholesaler laws on alcohol related public health. Two reasons for the limited prior research on
alcohol wholesaler laws are the difficulty of collecting data on these laws and the limited
number of changes in the laws over time. A study by Ornstein and Hanssens (1985) using
data from 1974-1978 finds that post-and-hold laws and minimum markups increased the price
of spirits. Jaeger and Storchmann (2011) conclude that the state alcohol price laws more or
less effectively abolish competition between wine retail outlets, which should increase prices.
The most recent and comprehensive study is by Cooper and Wright (2012) (CW) who show
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that post-and-hold laws reduce consumption by 2-8%. However, they find no relationship
between post-and-hold laws and drunk driving accidents nor with underage drinking. CW
conclude that post-and-hold laws have no effect.
This paper specifically reexamines the empirical results for alcohol consumption found by
CW and resolves the inconsistency between the results for alcohol consumption and the
results for highway fatalities and underage drinking. Our paper expands the work of CW
by extending the sample period and with additional analysis of state specific time trends
and lead and lagged effects. We first re-estimate the empirical specifications presented by
CW and are able to closely recreate their results with our new data set limited to 1983 to
2004, which was the time period CW investigated. Next, we add data from 2005 to 2012.
Adding additional years leads to a critical change in results. We find little evidence for
statistically significant effects of post-and-hold laws on ethanol consumption. These results
are consistent with CW’s findings for drunk driving and underage drinking and confirm their
conclusion that post-and-hold laws do not reduce alcohol consumption. This new evidence
on the ineffectiveness of these laws is important to both the courts and to the states with
these laws because of the increasing pressure to eliminate them. Our research and the research presented by CW are also important to public health in that efforts to support these
laws are not likely to reduce problems with excessive alcohol consumption.

3.2

Data

The study of wholesale laws is complicated by both the limited time variation in state
wholesale laws and the limited availability of historical data. States that employ a state
owned monopoly for the wholesaling of alcohol, by beverage type, are not included because
the wholesale laws relate only to private wholesalers. Two states are monopolies for wholesale beer, three states are monopolies for wholesale wine and 18 states are monopolies for
wholesale spirits. Data on post-and-hold laws for beer, wine and spirits from 1983 to 2010
were published by CW and checked for consistency with the newly published wholesale laws
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in the Alcohol Policy Information System (APIS).3 We used the APIS data to extend the
sample period provided by CW to 2012.
The wholesale law data were merged with alcohol consumption data, alcohol demand variables and alcohol tax data. Data on beer, wine and spirits per capita consumption was
obtained from the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism.4 Data is currently
available up until 2012. Consumption is reported on the state level in ethanol equivalent gallons and is divided by the state population that is 14 years of age and older. These variables
were also added together to create a total ethanol consumption variable called alcohol. The
independent variables include measures related to alcohol demand. Data on the percentage
of the population, by year-state aggregate, who are white, married and age 18 or older were
included. Also, data on median household income per capita was included. These data are
available from the US Census. Data on the percentage of the population, by year-state aggregate, that are members of Evangelical or Catholic religious institutions, comes from the
Association of Religious Data Archives.5 These surveys are done every 10 years and thus
the percentages between survey dates were interpolated. Also included were data on zero
tolerance laws, blood alcohol concentration laws and the minimum legal drinking age from
the National Highway Traffic Administration.6 The beer excise tax, wine excise tax and
spirits tax come from the Brewers Almanac, the National Tax Foundation and state specific
sources.7 Finally, data on Sunday sales bans were taken from APIS and data on per capita
retail outlets were taken from the U.S. Census.8 The latter two variables were available only
from 1998 to 2012. Means and standard deviation for all variables are presented in Table
3.1.
3

The data are from: http://www.alcoholpolicy.niaaa.nih.gov. Cooper and Wright (2012) did not include Washington State in their regressions, but did present Washington State data in a descriptive table.
Washington State temporarily dropped their post-and-hold law in 2008 but the courts required that it be
reinstated.
4
http://pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/surveillance98 /CONS12.pdf. These data are currently available
only to 2012.
5
http://www.thearda.com/
6
http://www.nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/810942.pdf
7
http://taxfoundation.org
8
http://censtats.census.gov/cgi-bin/cbpnaic/cbpcomp.pl
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A regression analysis of the volume discount, minimum price and credit restriction laws
is not possible because we only have data on these laws from 2003 to 2014 and over this
time period there is no time variation in these laws. However, a descriptive analysis provides
some evidence on the effects of these laws. Figure 3.1 uses data from 2012 and shows annual
gallons of ethanol consumption per capita for states with zero to four laws. Beer, wine and
spirits consumption data are presented. Typically, states have one or two laws and very
few states have three or four laws. Figure 3.1 suggests that there is very little correlation
between the number of laws and per capita ethanol consumption.

3.3
3.3.1

The Empirical Approach
Difference-in-Differences Model

The empirical approach is a difference-in-differences (DD) model. The intuition behind a
DD model is to employ the change over time in states that have not rescinded their postand-hold laws as the counterfactual for the change experienced by states who did rescind
their law. The DD model isolates the effect of the policy change from the effect of both
time-invariant unobservables and from the effect of other economy-wide events that occur
over the time period by estimating the difference over time between the control states and
the treatment states.
The following DD model is estimated, following Angrist and Pischke (2008):

Cstj = θ0 + θ1 P Hstj + θ2 EXstj + θ3 Xst + ηs + ηt + ηst + µstj

(3.1)

Cstj is consumption in state s, at time t, for beverage type j (alcohol, beer, wine, spirits).
P Hstj indicates the presence of a post-and-hold law for beverage j in a state s, at time
t. EXstj is the sum of federal and state excise taxes, Xst represents other alcohol demand
variables, ηs are state fixed effects, ηt are time fixed effects, ηst are state specific time trends
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and µstj is an idiosyncratic error. The key identifying assumption in any DD model is the
common-time trend assumption. That is, trends in alcohol consumption would have been the
same in both treatment and control states had the post-and-hold laws never been rescinded
in the treatment states. The time trend in states with and without a post-and-hold law can
be observed. If these time trends are similar in the pre-treatment period, the assumption
that without the treatment, treatment states would have behaved similar to control states
is reasonable.
Figures 3.2a, 3.2b, and 3.2c present the time trends in beer, wine and spirits consumption, respectively. Figure 3.2a indicates a continuous decrease in beer consumption over our
sample period. Figure 3.2b indicates a more complex pattern for wine consumption, with
steady increases since the 1990s. Figure 3.2c indicates a decline in spirits consumption until
about 2000 followed by steady increases. In all three figures the solid lines represent consumption in states which have post-and-hold laws in place, the dashed line shows the same
time trends for states without post-and-hold laws. States are shifted from the treatment
into the control group based on changes in their laws. For example, Delaware rescinded its
post-and-hold law for wine and spirits in 1999 and thus is in the post-and-hold group up
until 1999 and subsequently in the no post-and-hold group. In Figure 3.2a, the difference
between the states with and without post-and-hold laws is virtually constant. In Figures
3.2b and 3.2c, for wine and spirits consumption, respectively, the time pattern is also very
similar for states with and without post-and-hold laws. Figure 3.2a and Figure 3.2c show
that beer and spirits consumption in states that have post-and-hold laws is higher than in
states without the laws although the reverse is true for wine consumption. It is important to
note that differences in levels between what are essentially the treatment and control groups
are not a threat to the identification strategy. The key identifying assumption is that the
trends in alcohol consumption, not the levels, are the same in both types of states. The raw
data suggests that this is indeed the case for the three beverages.
An important estimation issue in DD models involves the inclusion of state-specific time
trends (Bertrand et al., 2004). While the time fixed effects account for national trends in
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factors influencing alcohol consumption, adding controls for state-specific time trends offers
a flexible way to control for additional heterogeneity. These added variables account for
state-specific characteristics affecting alcohol consumption while allowing the slopes of these
trends to vary across states. Without state-specific trends, the common national time trend
might confuse the effect of post-and-hold laws on alcohol consumption with the effects of
state-specific characteristics that change over time. Therefore, failing to control for statespecific time trends can lead to omitted variable bias as the coefficient for post-and-hold
law also absorbs the effect of, for example, changing sentiment in some states. Of course,
such omitted variable bias would be at odds with the purported exogeneity in the timing of
post-and-hold law adoption or revocation. It is also hard to disentangle the effects of the
policy measure per se from the effects of pre-existing trends. Moreover, it is not obvious what
type of time trend (linear, quadratic, high polynomial) is appropriate. That is, controls for
state-specific time trends are not a panacea. However, it is important to assess robustness
with respect to the inclusion of these control variables. Therefore, in all regression tables,
specifications with state-specific linear time trends and state-specific quadratic time trends
are included.9 As will be seen, by and large, the point estimates do not change much in
response, although the standard errors decrease in some instances. This is positive because
it indicates that there is no large, undetected effect that is masked by other state-specific
developments.
Another issue is the potential for endogeneity of the post-and-hold laws. Endogeneity
would occur if alcohol consumption and post-and-hold laws were causal on each other or if
an omitted third factor were causal on both alcohol consumption and post-and-hold laws.
However, the possibility of endogeneity is limited because the enactment of post-and-hold
laws reflects alcohol sentiment in 1933 and the more recent revocations of these laws probably reflects successful or threatened court cases brought by large alcohol retailers rather
than state trends in alcohol sentiment.

9

Higher order polynomials were tested but yielded no insight beyond what was found with quadratic
trends.
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Difference-in-Differences Results

The DD regression results for the effects of post-and-hold laws on total ethanol, beer, wine
and spirits consumption are presented in Tables 3.2 -3.5, respectively. The specifications are
based on equation 3.1. There are nine specifications in each table and each table follows the
same pattern. The first and second column recreates specifications employed by CW. The
third through the sixth specification extend the sample period to 2012 and include various
combinations of demographic variables, religion variables, drunk driving laws and linear or
quadratic state specific time trends. Specification three is identical to specification one but
with a longer sample period. Specification four adds the tax variable as well as controls for
demand factors. Specification five and six then add linear or quadratic state-specific time
trends, respectively. Finally, in columns seven, eight, and nine the sample period is reduced
to 1998-2012 in order to include controls for Sunday sales bans and a retailer density variable,
which are not available before 1998. Specification seven is the same as specification four but
with the shorter sample period and does not include the Sunday retail ban and retail outlet
density variables. This specification is included in order to show the effect of only a shorter
sample period. In specification eight, controls for Sunday retail bans and retail outlet densities are then added. This allows for a distinction between the effect of these variables and
the change in the time period under review. In specification 9, quadratic state-specific time
trends are added. All regression models were estimated with state level clustered standard
errors and all specifications included state and year fixed effects.
Table 3.2 presents the results for the effect of post-and-hold laws on total ethanol consumption. Note that the post-and-hold variable in this specification is defined as equal to one if a
state has a post-and-hold law for any alcoholic beverage in a specific year. The table shows
that the coefficient of the post-and-hold law is negative and significant in specifications one
and two, which recreates the work of CW. However, in the seven remaining specifications
in Table 3.2, the post-and-hold law coefficient is not different from zero at any reasonable
level of significance. The outlet density is positive and significant in one specification but
the Sunday ban coefficients are not statistically significant. These results suggest that the
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significant coefficients for post-and-hold laws are not robust with respect to the choice of
sample period.
Table 3.3 presents the results for the effects of the post-and-hold law and excise taxes on
beer consumption. The post-and-hold law indicators are negative in all specification and
significant in five specifications. The first significant specification is specification (2), which
recreates CW with the excise tax included. When the sample period is extended to 2012, the
effect of the post-and-hold law becomes insignificant. However, when linear and quadratic
state specific trends are included the post-and-hold coefficients are again significant. At the
same time, the point estimates are relatively stable. When the sample period is reduced
to 1998 to 2012, the post-and-hold coefficients remain significant in specification (7) and
(8). If we discount specifications (7) through (9) because of the shorter sample period then
the significant estimates of the post-and-hold coefficients average about -0.030. Because the
mean per capita beer consumption in gallons of ethanol is 1.29, eliminating a post-and-hold
law would increase beer consumption by about 2.3%. The excise tax coefficients are negative
and significant in all but one specification.
Table 3.4 presents the results for the effects of the post-and-hold laws and excise taxes
on wine consumption. The post-and-hold laws are negative and significant in four specifications. The first two significant specifications are those that recreate CW. The increase in
the sample period does not affect the significance. However, when state specific time trends
are included, the post-and-hold laws become insignificant. The wine tax is also insignificant
while the Sunday sales ban appears to have a small significant and negative effect on wine
consumption. Overall, there is little support for an effect of post-and-hold laws on wine
consumption.
Table 3.5 presents the results for the effects of the post-and-hold laws and excise taxes on
spirits consumption. Our results, which replicate CW, are the same for one specification but
not the other. The quadratic state specific time trends specification is the only specification
that results in a negative and borderline significant coefficient for post-and-hold laws. Excise
taxes are generally negative and significant while the outlets per capita and Sunday bans
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appear to have no effect.
The results presented in Tables 3.2 - 3.5 do not provide much support for the effectiveness
of post-and-hold laws in reducing alcohol consumption. However, an additional concern is
that there may be a more complex reaction, over time and within states, to changes in the
law that needs to be modelled appropriately.10 The linear or quadratic time trends may fail
to account for a dynamic response to the change in post-and-hold laws especially around
the time that the law changes. The effect of revoking (introducing) post-and-hold laws in
these specifications accounting for state-specific trends is identified from a jump or drop in
alcohol consumption that constitutes a break from the underlying trends. If, for instance,
the effect of post-and-hold laws took a few years to materialize, we might underestimate its
effect. While this is a relatively unlikely scenario, a closer look at the dynamics is warranted.
Therefore, we implement an approach using leads and lags of the policy change. Note that
variation in the post-and-hold laws mostly stems from states that revoke their post-and-hold
laws.11 We created a set of mutually exclusive dichotomous variables indicating the time to,
or time since, a post-and-hold law was revoked in a state. For example, Delaware revoked its
post-and-hold law in 1999, therefore the post-and-hold variable is equal to one for Delaware
in the year 1999 and zero otherwise. The one year lag variable is equal to one for Delaware
in the year 2000 and zero otherwise. Three additional lag variables were defined for 2 to
3 years, 4 to 5 years and 6 or more years after the law was revoked. A similar set of lead
variables were also defined. The “6 or more” variable is equal to one for all states that never
had a post-and-hold law and all the lead and lag variables are equal to zero for states that
never revoked their post-and-hold law.
Regressions of beer, wine and spirits consumption that include a set of lead and lag postand-hold revocation variables were estimated. These regressions include all controls for
demographic, religion, alcohol law as well as state and time fixed effects included in Tables
3.2 - 3.5. All specifications are also assessed with respect to their robustness to the inclusion
10

Wolfers (2006) provides an example where this is the case and state-specific linear time trends fail to
account for such a complex relationship.
11
The lone exception is Washington State that introduced post-and-hold laws for beer and wine in 1995.
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of state specific time trend variables. That is, we run each specification in four variations:
without controls for state specific time trends, controlling for linear trends, controlling for
quadratic trends, and controlling for cubic trends. Rather than presenting all these results
in tables, a set of figures are employed. The figures presented are limited to models with no
state specific time trends and quadratic state specific time trends. Figures 3.3a - 3.3f plot
the coefficients and 95% confidence intervals of the lead and lag post-and-hold revocation
variables. These figures provide useful visualization of the dynamics of changing post-andhold laws.
The only figure that presents any significant lead or lag variables is the quadratic state
specific time trend model for beer. The one year lead variable, the year the law changed
and three of the lag variables are significant. Because these results are consistent with our
finding of a small effect in the difference-in-differences specifications presented in Table 3.3
there is no bias due to the dynamic effects. The lead and lag variables for beer consumption
without state specific time trends were all insignificant as were the lead and lag variables for
wine and spirits. The figures indicate that there is no dynamic effect for wine and spirits
which is consistent with our results in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 which also show no effect of the law
change on consumption. Because the lead and lag variable coefficients for wine and spirits
are all insignificant, the DD results are not biased by dynamic effects.
A final question pertains to the effect of other alcohol wholesale laws on small retailers. In
theory, these laws protect small alcohol retailers. Small stores generally have higher prices,
which should reduce consumption. This is difficult to empirically test because almost all
states allow the sale of beer in grocery stores and many states allow the sale of wine and
spirits in grocery stores. Comparisons of grocery store densities are not useful because these
stores sell a wide variety of other products. However, a comparison can be made by limiting
the data to wine and spirits and to states that do not allow the sale of these products in
grocery stores. There are only 11 states that fit these criteria. Figure 3.4 presents the number stores with five or less employees as a percent of all stores by the number of wholesale
restrictions in the included states. The number of small stores is about the same for zero,
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one and two restrictions. There are no states with three restrictions and, in this sample, only
Connecticut has four restrictions. Figure 3.4 shows Connecticut has relatively more small
alcohol retailers than the other states in this limited sample. Of course, this is only suggestive evidence. This result could also be driven by other unobserved factors in Connecticut.

3.4

Conclusion

The primary purpose of this paper was to evaluate the effectiveness of post-and-hold laws
on alcohol consumption. Theoretically, post-and-hold laws should raise prices of specific
products and could reduce consumption. DD models were employed with a 30-year panel of
state level data. Specifications with and without state specific time trends were estimated.
While the state-trend coefficients were for the most part both individually and jointly statistically significant, the adjusted R-square was hardly affected and the point estimates did
not change very much. Some evidence was found for a small negative effect of post-and-hold
laws on beer consumption but no real evidence of an effect for total ethanol, wine and spirits
consumption was found. One possible explanation of these results is that the wholesale markets for alcohol are so highly regulated that post-and-hold laws have no discernible marginal
effect. For example, many states use mandated exclusive territories, which make wholesalers
monopolists for specific products in specific areas. Beer markets, on the other hand, may be
more competitive.
The empirical results for alcohol excise taxes are found to be associated with lower consumption, which is consistent with many prior studies. Economic theory predicts that compared to regulation, taxation is often a more efficient way of internalizing negative externalities. Regulation can result in income for certain favored groups such as small retailers
while taxes generate revenue for the state. In addition, the price mechanism has proven to
be powerful at changing undesirable behaviors. The empirical evidence in this paper and
in other papers confirms these predictions. Of course, higher prices may not necessarily be
welfare enhancing because most individuals drink moderately and do not cause any negative
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externalities. The goals of the post-prohibition plan were to maximize tax revenues while
promoting temperance. The results from this paper, along with the CW paper, suggest that
excise taxes are a better alternative to achieving these goals than post-and-hold laws.
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Tables and Figures
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Name
Per Capita Ethanol Consumption
Per Capita Beer Consumption
Per Capita Wine Consumption
Per Capita Spirits Consumption
Post-and-Hold Law for Beer

Post-and-Hold Law for Wine

Post-and-Hold Law for Spirits
Beer Tax (per Gallon)
Wine Tax (per Gallon)
Spirits Tax (per Gallon)
Income
Married
White
Age less than 18
Evangelical
Catholic
Law Requiring BAC < .08 to drive
Minimum Legal Drinking Age of 21
Zero Tolerance Laws
Sunday Sales Ban on Beer
Sunday Sales Ban on Wine
Sunday Sales Ban on Spirits
Per Capita Retail Outlets

Definition
Ethanol consumption in gallons divided by
population over 14.
Beer consumption in gallons of ethanol
divided by population over 14.
Wine consumption in gallons of ethanol
divided by population over 14.
Spirits consumption in gallons of ethanol
divided by population over 14.
A dichotomous variable that equals one if a
post-and-hold law for beer was in place in a
state at a given time.
A dichotomous variable that equals one if a
post-and-hold law for time wine was in place
in a state at a given time.
A dichotomous variable that equals one if a
post-and-hold law for spirits was in place in a
state at a given time.
Federal and state excise taxes per gallon of
beer (in $)
Federal and state excise taxes per gallon of
wine (in $)
Federal and state excise taxes per gallon of
spirits (in $)
Median nominal household income in $1000.
Percentage of the population that is married
Percentage of the population that is white
Percentage of the population that is younger
than 18 years old
State’s percentage of Evangelicals
State’s percentage of Catholics
A dichotomous variable that equals one - a
legal BAC limit of .08
A dichotomous variable that equals one if the
state minimum drinking age is 21.
A dichotomous variable for states with zero
tolerance laws for underage drunk driving.
A dichotomous variable for states with a
Sunday sales ban on beer (1998-2012)
A dichotomous variable for states with a
Sunday sales ban on wine (1998-2012)
A dichotomous variable for states with a
Sunday sales ban on spirits (1998-2012)
Number of alcohol retail outlets (per 1,000
people)

Mean

SD

2.41

0.59

1.29

0.22

0.33

0.18

0.79

0.31

0.23

0.42

0.26

0.44

0.27

0.45

0.74

0.25

1.52

0.69

16.63

3.54

37.43
0.54
0.81

11.39
0.05
0.14

0.26

0.03

0.14
0.21

0.11
0.14

0.45

0.5

0.93

0.26

0.58

0.49

0.28

0.45

0.31

0.46

0.31

0.46

0.11

0.07

1,056
0.937
1983-2004
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
0.933

Aggregate
−0.055∗
(0.031)

1,007
0.964
1983-2004
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
0.961

Aggregate
−0.086∗
(0.046)

1,448
0.920
1983-2012
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
0.916

Aggregate
−0.025
(0.058)

(3)

1,352
0.945
1983-2012
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
0.941

Aggregate
−0.024
(0.038)

1,352
0.983
1983-2012
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Linear
0.981

Aggregate
−0.014
(0.041)

(4)
(5)
Extended Time Period

1,352
0.990
1983-2012
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Quadratic
0.988

Aggregate
−0.062
(0.041)

(6)

635
0.972
1998-2012
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
0.969

635
0.973
1998-2012
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
0.970

Aggregate
0.045
(0.036)
−1.364
(0.948)
−0.033
(0.061)

635
0.992
1998-2012
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Quadratic
0.989

Aggregate
0.015
(0.021)
1.752∗∗
(0.842)
0.026
(0.021)

(8)
(9)
Limited Time Period

Aggregate
0.054
(0.043)

(7)

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors account for clustering at the state level.
∗ ∗ ∗/ ∗ ∗/∗ indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
Demographic controls include a state’s median household income, percentage of the population that is white, percentage of the population that is younger than 18
years, percentage of the population that is married and all alcohol excise taxes. Religion controls are a state’s percentage of Catholics and a state’s percentage of
Evangelicals. Controls for alcohol laws consist of three dummies, indicating the presence of minimum drinking age laws for age 21, legal BAC limit of .08, and of
zero tolerance laws for underage drunk driving.

Observations
R-squared
Time-Period
State-Fixed-Effects
Time-Fixed-Effects
Alcohol Taxes
Demo/Demand Factors
Religion
Alcohol Laws
Sunday Sales Ban (Beer)
Retailer Density
State-Specific Trends
Adjusted R-squared

Ban on Sunday Sales

Retail Outlets per 1,000

Post-and-Hold Law

(1)
(2)
Recreate CW

Table 3.2: Difference-in-Differences Per Capita Total Ethanol Consumption
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1,056
0.900
1983-2004
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
0.893

Beer
−0.019
(0.021)

1,053
0.927
1983-2004
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
0.921

Beer
−0.017∗
(0.009)
−0.209∗∗∗
(0.043)

1,448
0.864
1983-2012
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
0.856

Beer
−0.033
(0.029)

(3)

1,445
0.897
1983-2012
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
0.89

Beer
−0.029
(0.024)
−0.260∗∗∗
(0.084)

1,445
0.964
1983-2012
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Linear
0.961

Beer
−0.019∗
(0.011)
−0.065∗∗
(0.027)

(4)
(5)
Extended Time Period

1,445
0.977
1983-2012
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Quadratic
0.973

Beer
−0.040∗∗∗
(0.013)
−0.040∗∗
(0.018)

(6)

728
0.949
1998-2012
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
0.943

728
0.949
1998-2012
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
0.943

Beer
−0.112∗∗∗
(0.018)
−0.112∗∗∗
(0.033)
−0.136
(0.367)
−0.01
(0.020)

728
0.979
1998-2012
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Quadratic
0.973

Beer
−0.02
(0.013)
−0.029
(0.020)
−0.202
(0.355)
0.014
(0.017)

(8)
(9)
Limited Time Period

Beer
−0.117∗∗∗
(0.01)
−0.111∗∗∗
(0.034)

(7)

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors account for clustering at the state level.
∗ ∗ ∗/ ∗ ∗/∗ indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
Demographic controls include a state’s median household income, percentage of the population that is white, percentage of the population that is younger than 18
years, percentage of the population that is married and all alcohol excise taxes. Religion controls are a state’s percentage of Catholics and a state’s percentage of
Evangelicals. Controls for alcohol laws consist of three dummies, indicating the presence of minimum drinking age laws for age 21, legal BAC limit of .08, and of
zero tolerance laws for underage drunk driving.

Observations
R-squared
Time-Period
State-Fixed-Effects
Time-Fixed-Effects
Alcohol Taxes
Demo/Demand Factors
Religion
Alcohol Laws
Sunday Sales Ban (Beer)
Retailer Density
State-Specific Trends
Adjusted R-squared

Ban on Sunday Sales

Retail Outlets per 1,000

Beer Excise Tax

Post-and-Hold Law

(1)
(2)
Recreate CW

Table 3.3: Difference-in-Differences Per Capita Beer Consumption
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990
0.936
1983-2004
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
0.931

Wine
−0.043∗
(0.024)

986
0.947
1983-2004
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
0.943

Wine
−0.050∗
(0.027)
−0.006
(0.024)

1,358
0.926
1983-2012
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
0.922

Wine
−0.046
(0.029)

(3)

1,354
0.934
1983-2012
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
0.929

Wine
−0.053∗
(0.029)
−0.019
(0.020)

1,354
0.981
1983-2012
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Linear
0.979

Wine
0.001
(0.014)
0.009
(0.013)

(4)
(5)
Extended Time Period

1,354
0.988
1983-2012
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Quadratic
0.986

Wine
−0.002
(0.008)
0.003
(0.012)

(6)

682
0.983
1998-2012
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
0.981

682
0.983
1998-2012
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
0.981

Wine
0.013
(0.020)
0.01
(0.008)
−0.113
(0.168)
−0.024∗
(0.014)

682
0.996
1998-2012
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Quadratic
0.994

Wine
0.008∗
(0.004)
−0.003
(0.010)
0.013
(0.122)
0.005
(0.006)

(8)
(9)
Limited Time Period

Wine
0.01
(0.024)
0.009
(0.008)

(7)

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors account for clustering at the state level.
∗ ∗ ∗/ ∗ ∗/∗ indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
Demographic controls include a state’s median household income, percentage of the population that is white, percentage of the population that is younger than 18
years, percentage of the population that is married and all alcohol excise taxes. Religion controls are a state’s percentage of Catholics and a state’s percentage of
Evangelicals. Controls for alcohol laws consist of three dummies, indicating the presence of minimum drinking age laws for age 21, legal BAC limit of .08, and of
zero tolerance laws for underage drunk driving.

Observations
R-squared
Time-Period
State-Fixed-Effects
Time-Fixed-Effects
Alcohol Taxes
Demo/Demand Factors
Religion
Alcohol Laws
Sunday Sales Ban (Wine)
Retailer Density
State-Specific Trends
Adjusted R-squared

Ban on Sunday Sales

Retail Outlets per 1,000

Wine Excise Tax

Post-and-Hold Law

(1)
(2)
Recreate CW

Table 3.4: Difference-in-Differences Per Capita Wine Consumption
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704
0.906
1983-2004
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
0.898

Spirits
−0.049
(0.058)

701
0.943
1983-2004
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
0.937

Spirits
−0.069
(0.044)
−0.026∗∗
(0.012)

960
0.885
1983-2012
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
0.877

Spirits
−0.039
(0.078)

(3)

957
0.923
1983-2012
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
0.917

Spirits
−0.053
(0.064)
−0.027∗∗∗
(0.009)

957
0.978
1983-2012
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Linear
0.976

Spirits
−0.047
(0.034)
−0.009
(0.007)

(4)
(5)
Extended Time Period

957
0.988
1983-2012
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Quadratic
0.986

Spirits
−0.044∗
(0.023)
−0.012∗∗∗
(0.004)

(6)

480
0.965
1998-2012
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
0.961

480
0.967
1998-2012
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
0.963

Spirits
−0.019
(0.036)
−0.009∗
(0.005)
−1.276
(0.875)
−0.041
(0.037)

480
0.990
1998-2012
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Quadratic
0.986

Spirits
−0.042∗
(0.022)
−0.011
(0.009)
1.495∗
(0.837)
−0.001
(0.01)

(8)
(9)
Limited Time Period

Spirits
−0.023
(0.048)
−0.009∗
(0.005)

(7)

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors account for clustering at the state level.
∗ ∗ ∗/ ∗ ∗/∗ indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
Demographic controls include a state’s median household income, percentage of the population that is white, percentage of the population that is younger than 18
years, percentage of the population that is married and all alcohol excise taxes. Religion controls are a state’s percentage of Catholics and a state’s percentage of
Evangelicals. Controls for alcohol laws consist of three dummies, indicating the presence of minimum drinking age laws for age 21, legal BAC limit of .08, and of zero
tolerance laws for underage drunk driving.

Observations
R-squared
Time-Period
State-Fixed-Effects
Time-Fixed-Effects
Alcohol Taxes
Demo/Demand Factors
Religion
Alcohol Laws
Sunday Sales Ban (Spirits)
Retailer Density
State-Specific Trends
Adjusted R-squared

Ban on Sunday Sales

Retail Outlets per 1,000

Spirits Excise Tax

Post-and-Hold Law

(1)
(2)
Recreate CW

Table 3.5: Difference-in-Differences Per Capita Spirits Consumption
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CHAPTER 3. POST-AND-HOLD LAWS AND ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION
Figure 3.1: Alcohol Consumption and Number of Laws (2012)
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Figure 3.2: Alcohol Consumption Over Time
(a) Beer Consumption in Gallons of Ethanol (1983-2012)

(b) Wine Consumption in Gallons of Ethanol (1983-2012)
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(c) Spirits Consumption in Gallons of Ethanol (1983-2012)
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Figure 3.3: Dynamic Responses in Alcohol Consumption

(a) Dynamic Response: Beer Consump- (b) Dynamic Response: Beer Consumption (No Controls for State-Specific tion (With Controls for State-Specific
Trends)
Trends)

(c) Dynamic Response: Wine Consumption (No Controls for StateSpecific Trends)

(d) Dynamic Response: Wine Consumption (With Controls for StateSpecific Trends)

(e) Dynamic Response: Spirits Consumption (No Controls for StateSpecific Trends)

(f) Dynamic Response: Spirits Consumption (With Controls for StateSpecific Trends)
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Figure 3.4: Small Retailers as a Percent of all Retailers by Number of Restrictions

Notes: Sample includes only states which do not allow wine or spirits sales in grocery stores. There are no states in this set
which have three restrictions.
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